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Temporary migrants comprise approximately 11% of the Australian workforce and are sys-
temically underpaid across a range of industries. The most vulnerable of these workers (in-
cluding international students and backpackers) rarely successfully recover unpaid wages 
and entitlements. In 2015, media revealed systematic exploitation of 7-Eleven’s interna-
tional student workforce, reflecting practices that have since been identified in other major 
Australian franchises. In an unprecedented response, 7-Eleven head office established a 
wage repayment program, which operated until February 2017. As of mid-2017, the pro-
gram had determined claims worth over $150 million — by far the highest rectification of 
unpaid wages in Australian history. Drawing on interviews with international students 
and a range of stakeholders across Australia, this article uses 7-Eleven as a case study to 
illuminate systemic barriers that prevent temporary migrants from accessing remedies for 
unpaid entitlements within existing legal and institutional frameworks. We identify the 
unique attributes of the 7-Eleven wage repayment program that have contributed to its 
unusual accessibility and efficacy, and which may point to conditions needed to improve 
temporary migrants’ access to justice through state-based institutions and business-led re-
dress processes. 
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I   I N T R O D U C T IO N 
Mohamed Rashid Ullat Thodi came to Geelong from India in 2007 to under-
take a double degree in architecture and construction management.1 After ap-
plying for 40 positions without success, and facing high living expenses and 
university fees, he accepted a job at a 7-Eleven store.2 He was initially engaged 
as an unpaid ‘trainee’, and for two months he worked four to five shifts a week 
cleaning toilets, windows and air conditioning vents, stacking shelves and mop-
ping floors without pay.3 Eventually he began to earn $10 per hour, working 
approximately 50 hours each week, although his payslip recorded only 20 hours 
at the award wage rate.4 His employer explained that this arrangement was  
designed to benefit him by disguising the fact that he was exceeding the  
40-hour-per-fortnight work restriction on his student visa. When, a year later, 
he requested a pay rise to $11 per hour he was summarily dismissed.5 As  
 
 1 Mohamed Rashid Ullat Thodi, Supplementary Submission No 59.2 to Senate Education and 
Employment References Committee, Inquiry into the Impact of Australia’s Temporary Work 
Visa Programs on the Australian Labour Market and on the Temporary Work Visa Holders (22 
September 2015) 1; Interview with Former 7-Eleven Employee (Phone, 4 May 2016). 
 2 Evidence to Education and Employment References Committee, Senate, Melbourne, 24 Sep-
tember 2015, 4 (Mohamed Rashid Ullat Thodi). 
 3 Ullat Thodi, Supplementary Submission (n 1) 1–2. 
 4 Ibid 2. 
 5 Interview with Former 7-Eleven Employee (Phone, 4 May 2016). 
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Ullat Thodi later recalled to a Senate inquiry into exploitation of temporary 
migrant workers: 
[T]hey will tell you: ‘We are like a family. We’ll give you a job and help you  
out. Work more hours than the 20-hour limit.’ … I have been told, ‘Don’t go  
and speak about your pay to anybody, because if you do you’ll be in trouble be-
cause they will find out you are working more than 20 hours, then you will  
be deported.’6 
Ullat Thodi is one of thousands of international students who, over many years, 
were systemically underpaid by 7-Eleven franchisees across Australia. Amidst 
extensive media exposure and the public scrutiny of the Senate inquiry,7  
7-Eleven quickly became the crucible for public concerns about the exploita-
tion of temporary migrant labour. In particular, it drew pointed attention to the 
exploitation of international students, which has been well documented within 
scholarly literature in Australia.8 
While the scale and systemic nature of the exploitation by 7-Eleven were 
shocking to many, there are two striking dimensions to the story which have 
received far less scholarly or media attention. First, in the many years over 
which thousands of 7-Eleven employees were underpaid, exceptionally few had 
attempted to recover their unpaid wages through the Fair Work Ombudsman 
(‘FWO’), unions or courts.9 Second, and even more remarkably, in the wake  
of the exposure of the exploitative practices, thousands of current and former 
7-Eleven employees subsequently filed claims through the 7-Eleven wage re-
payment program (‘WRP’). 
This became the largest wage repayment in Australian history. Established 
and funded by 7-Eleven’s head office, the WRP was tasked with determining 
 
 6 Evidence to Education and Employment References Committee, Senate, Melbourne, 24 Sep-
tember 2015, 4 (Mohamed Rashid Ullat Thodi). 
 7 The Senate Committee held three public hearings on matters related to 7-Eleven in Melbourne 
on 24 September and 20 November 2015, and in Canberra on 5 February 2016. Testimonies 
were heard from 7-Eleven head office co-owner and chairman Russell Withers, community 
advocate Michael Fraser, and five former employees of 7-Eleven, among others: Senate Educa-
tion and Employment References Committee, Parliament of Australia, A National Disgrace: 
The Exploitation of Temporary Work Visa Holders (Report, March 2016) app 2, 353–4. 
 8 See, eg, Iain Campbell, Martina Boese and Joo-Cheong Tham, ‘Inhospitable Workplaces? In-
ternational Students and Paid Work in Food Services’ (2016) 51 Australian Journal of Social 
Issues 279; Laurie Berg, Migrant Rights at Work: Law’s Precariousness at the Intersection of Im-
migration and Labour (Routledge, 2016) 96–7; Alexander Reilly et al, International Students 
and the Fair Work Ombudsman (Report, March 2017). 
 9 Part IV(C) considers the circumstances of the very small number of employees who sought to 
recover their wages, and the outcomes of those attempts. 
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and paying out any franchise employee’s claim for unpaid wages and entitle-
ments. Within two years, it had paid out over $150 million to 3,667 current  
and former employees.10 This is extraordinary compared with the previous  
conduct of underpaid 7-Eleven workers, and because international students 
and other temporary migrants in Australia very rarely seek to recover their un-
paid wages.11 
To address this broader phenomenon, this article seeks to understand why 
so many thousands of international students working at 7-Eleven did not or 
could not recover their unpaid wages through the FWO and existing remedial 
processes in Australia. We then unpack the features of the WRP that enabled 
thousands of vulnerable employees to achieve such vastly different outcomes. 
Although scholars have undertaken detailed analyses of structural factors con-
tributing to exploitation of temporary migrants in Australia,12 there has been 
limited data available on temporary migrants’ access to remedies for unpaid 
wages and entitlements. This is likely attributable to the challenges in obtaining 
data on the magnitude of exploitation and number of potential claims on the 
one hand, and the number of claims made and their outcomes on the other. The 
7-Eleven case study therefore presents a unique opportunity to evaluate the bar-
riers impeding temporary migrants’ access to existing remedial mechanisms 
and the conditions that may ameliorate them. 
This article arises out of a broader empirical study on temporary migrant 
workers’ access to justice in Australia, drawing on a range of data sources (‘Na-
tional Temporary Migrant Work Survey’).13 Field research was conducted be-
tween 20 January 2016 and 17 February 2017 in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, 
 
 10 7-Eleven Wage Repayment Program (Website, 11 December 2017) (at ‘Claim Determination’) 
<www.wagerepaymentprogram.com.au>, archived at <https://perma.cc/S42E-Q72Z>. 
 11 Catherine Hemingway, ‘Not Just Work: Ending the Exploitation of Refugee and Migrant Work-
ers’ (WEstjustice Employment Law Project Final Report, 2016) 9. See also Reilly et al  
(n 8) ch 4. 
 12 See, eg, Martina Boese et al, ‘Temporary Migrant Nurses in Australia: Sites and Sources of 
Precariousness’ (2013) 24 Economic and Labour Relations Review 316; Alexander Reilly, ‘Low-
Cost Labour or Cultural Exchange? Reforming the Working Holiday Visa Programme’ (2015) 
26 Economic and Labour Relations Review 474, 482–4; Joo-Cheong Tham, Iain Campbell and 
Martina Boese, ‘Why Is Labour Protection for Temporary Migrant Workers So Fraught? A 
Perspective from Australia’ in Joanna Howe and Rosemary Owens (eds), Temporary Labour 
Migration in the Global Era: The Regulatory Challenges (Hart Publishing, 2016) 173, 189, 195; 
Yao-Tai Li, ‘Constituting Co-Ethnic Exploitation: The Economic and Cultural Meanings of 
Cash-in-Hand Jobs for Ethnic Chinese Migrants in Australia’ (2017) 43 Critical Sociology 919. 
 13 Laurie Berg and Bassina Farbenblum, Wage Theft in Australia: Findings of the National Tempo-
rary Migrant Work Survey (Survey, November 2017) (‘National Temporary Migrant Work Sur-
vey’). 
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Adelaide and Canberra. This included six focus groups with 26 temporary mi-
grants (including former 7-Eleven employees)14 and 36 interviews with a range 
of stakeholders including government agencies, 7-Eleven management, legal 
service-providers, advocates, unions and three former 7-Eleven employees.15 
The National Temporary Migrant Work Survey yielded 4,322 responses from in-
dividuals who have worked on a temporary visa in Australia.16 The study also 
draws upon case data and information supplied by the FWO, the Department 
of Immigration and Border Protection (‘DIBP’), 7-Eleven head office and Mi-
chael Fraser,17 as well as 7-Eleven workers’ testimony before the Senate inquiry 
and relevant case law. 
Understanding the experiences of 7-Eleven employees and the company’s 
remedial response is especially timely and significant as some of Australia’s 
largest franchises confront similar exploitative practices in their businesses.18 It 
will also provide much-needed illumination of these issues for government and 
other actors seeking to better respond to widespread non-compliance with the 
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (‘FW Act’) in relation to temporary migrants. 
 
 14 Focus groups were conducted in Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane. 
 15 Interviewees included: Angus McKay, CEO of 7-Eleven head office and other senior manage-
ment officials; Allan Fels, former head of the 7-Eleven Fels Wage Fairness Panel; an organiser 
at worker representative body Unite; Gerard Dwyer, National Secretary of the Shop, Distribu-
tive and Allied Employees Association (‘SDA’); 7-Eleven employee advocate Michael Fraser; 
solicitors in law firms Levitt Robinson and Maurice Blackburn; and several senior FWO offi-
cials. 
 16 National Temporary Migrant Work Survey (n 13) 13, 54. 
 17 Michael Fraser is a consumer and business relationship advocate who works closely with dis-
affected customers and workers to achieve fair outcomes. For Fraser’s personal account of what 
occurred at 7-Eleven, see Michael Fraser, ‘Investigating 7-Eleven: Who Are the Real Bad Guys?’ 
(2016) 4 Griffith Journal of Law and Human Dignity 74. 
 18 See, eg, ABC Radio News and Current Affairs, ‘Delivery Driver Alleges Pizza Hut Puts Its  
Drivers in Dangerous Situations’, PM, 23 November 2015 (Tess Brunton) <www.abc.net.au/ 
news/2015-11-23/delivery-driver-alleges-pizza-hut-puts-its-drivers/6967198>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/4AL3-PL4L>; Mathew Dunckley, ‘Woolworths under Fire as Workplace 
Ombudsman Takes on Big Chains’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 27 May 2016) 
<www.smh.com.au/business/workplace-relations/woolworths-under-fire-as-workplace-
ombudsman-takes-on-big-chains-20160526-gp4xkl.html>, archived at <https://perma.cc/ 
SA7M-3SMF>; Adele Ferguson and Mario Christodoulou, ‘Caltex Doubles Down on  
Wage Fraud’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 4 November 2016) <www.smh.com.au/ 
business/workplace-relations/caltex-doubles-down-on-wage-fraud-20161103-gshdoz.html>, 
archived at <https://perma.cc/AMF4-WK4M>. 
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II   A  HI S T O RY  O F  F A I R  W OR K  AC T  CO N T R AV E N T IO N S   
B Y  7-EL E V E N  FR A N C H I S E S  
Exploitation of international students is hardly unique to 7-Eleven and has been 
explored in empirical research. As far back as 2005, one major study found that 
58% of working international students interviewed were earning less than the 
legal minimum wage.19 A 2015 survey of international university students 
found that 60% earned less than the federal minimum wage of $17.29 an hour.20 
Another detailed empirical study concluded that a higher proportion of stu-
dents working in the food services industry may experience underpayments 
than those in other industries.21 These results accord with a recent survey, the 
National Temporary Migrant Work Survey, conducted by the authors into tem-
porary migrants’ work conditions and access to employment remedies across 
Australia. We found pervasive and serious underpayment with half of the 2,528 
international student survey participants (55%) reporting that they were paid 
$15 or less per hour in their lowest paid job in Australia,22 and one third (28%) 
reporting that they were paid $12 or less per hour.23 Over four in five respond-
ents (86%) believed that many, most or all international students were paid less 
than the minimum wage.24 
Although not exceptional, the mistreatment of international students work-
ing in 7-Eleven stores, uncovered in late August 2015, was striking, in part, be-
cause of the sensational nature of the media coverage.25 Furthermore, far from 
 
 19 Chris Nyland et al, ‘International Student-Workers in Australia: A New Vulnerable Workforce’ 
(2009) 22 Journal of Education and Work 1, 7. Research undertaken in Victoria in 2012 by the 
hospitality sector union found that around a third of international students in their study re-
ported working unpaid hours additional to their ordinary shifts: Victorian TAFE International 
and United Voice, Taken to the Cleaners: Experiences of International Students Working in the 
Australian Retail Cleaning Industry (Report, November 2012) 17. 
 20 See Stephen Clibborn, ‘7‐Eleven: Amnesty Must Apply to All Exploited Workers’, The Sydney 
Morning Herald (Sydney, 9 September 2015) <www.smh.com.au/business/workplace-
relations/7eleven-amnesty-must-apply-to-all-20150908-gjheyp.html>, archived at <https:// 
perma.cc/48PM-DZAU>. 
 21 Campbell, Boese and Tham (n 8) 289. 
 22 The current minimum wage in Australia is $17.70 per hour, excluding casual loadings, indus-
try-specific awards, and penalty and overtime rates. 
 23 National Temporary Migrant Work Survey (n 13) 30–1. 
 24 Ibid 36. 
 25 Adele Ferguson, Sarah Danckert and Klaus Toft, ‘7-Eleven: A Sweatshop on Every  
Corner’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 29 August 2015) <www.smh.com.au/business/ 
workplace-relations/7eleven-a-sweatshop-on-every-corner-20150827-gj8vzn.html>, archived 
at <https://perma.cc/JP7H-PAMU>; ABC, ‘7-Eleven: The Price of Convenience’, Four Corners, 
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isolated incidents, the exploitative and fraudulent practices, including systemic 
underpayment26 and falsification of pay records,27 appeared to be widespread 
across the 626 franchisee-run stores nationwide. In addition, international stu-
dents predominated in this workforce: FWO’s survey of 20 franchise stores 
found that 84% of employees encountered by the regulator were international 
students.28 Although the centralised payroll service of 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd 
(‘7-Eleven’ or ‘head office’) ostensibly conformed to award wages, there were at 
least four standard underpayment practices across the franchisee network that 
had apparently been designed to escape detection.29  
First, as experienced by Ullat Thodi, there was a common practice of non-
payment for weeks or even months on the basis that an employee was a 
 
31 August 2015 <www.abc.net.au/4corners/stories/2015/08/30/4301164.htm>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/7V2H-VX39>. 
 26 Fair Work Ombudsman v Haider Pty Ltd [2015] FCCA 2113, [10] (‘These are matters where 
the allegations fair and squarely note that there had been a chronic underpayment and a chang-
ing of records or a falsifying of records’). See also Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth), ss 45 (prohibits 
contravening a term of a modern award, which set out minimum hourly rates, weekend and 
public holiday rates and overtime rates), 323–4 (requires the employer to pay entitlements in 
full, in money, and only to deduct amounts which are permitted) (‘FW Act’). The current rel-
evant industrial instruments setting out rates of pay, penalty rates and casual loading for 7-
Eleven employees are the General Retail Industry Award 2010 and the Vehicle Manufacturing, 
Repair, Services and Retail Award 2010, although some workers would have been covered by 
previous awards or, in a few limited cases, by specific enterprise agreements. 
 27 See, eg, Fair Work Ombudsman v Amritsaria Four Pty Ltd [2016] FCCA 968, [23] (‘Underpay-
ments were also deliberately concealed by a failure to keep proper records and, indeed, by fal-
sification of the records kept’); Fair Work Ombudsman v Mai Pty Ltd [2016] FCCA 1481, [76] 
(‘In response to the first Notice to Produce Mai produced the weekly time sheet reports, the 
detail payroll reports and the time books to the Fair Work Ombudsman knowing that they 
were false and misleading’); FWO, ‘Another 7-Eleven Store Faces Court Action’ (Media Re-
lease No 6045, 7 April 2016) (‘Mr Chang allegedly created false employment records when 
making false entries into the 7-Eleven head office payroll system. He and his company allegedly 
also knowingly provided false time-and-wage records to the Fair Work Ombudsman’); FWO, 
‘Brisbane 7-Eleven Outlet Faces Court Action’ (Media Release No 6807, 18 November 2016) 
(‘Mr Singh and the company allegedly also created false employment records when making 
false entries into the 7-Eleven head office payroll system’). Cf FW Act (n 26) ss 535 (‘An em-
ployer must make, and keep for 7 years, employee records of the kind prescribed by the regu-
lations in relation to each of its employees’), 536(1) (employer must provide pay slips); Fair 
Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) reg 3.44(1) (records kept by an employer must ‘not [be] false or 
misleading to the employer’s knowledge’). 
 28 FWO, A Report of the Fair Work Ombudsman’s Inquiry into 7-Eleven: Identifying and Address-
ing the Drivers of  Non-Compliance in the 7-Eleven Network (Report, April 2016) 46 (‘Inquiry 
into 7-Eleven’). 
 29 Ibid 7. 
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‘trainee’.30 This sometimes involved extended periods of arduous work.31 One 
employee was paid $325 for 691 hours of work as a ‘trainee’, or 47 cents per 
hour.32 This practice appears to be common among international students gen-
erally, with 42% of those who responded to the National Temporary Migrant 
Work Survey reporting that they had been asked to do unpaid work as ‘training’. 
In the second widespread practice, dubbed the ‘half pay scam’, franchisees 
only recorded half the hours worked by the employee in the central payroll  
system, resulting in an effective pay rate of half of the award or less for double 
the number of hours.33 Alongside this practice, many employees received pay 
slips showing only half their hours worked, and others never received pay slips 
at all.34  
Third, in the ‘cash back scam’, franchisees paid employees correctly through 
the payroll system but then required them to return a portion of their wages in 
cash.35 This arose in Fair Work Ombudsman v Mai Pty Ltd, where the franchisee 
paid back some of the approximately $82,000 he owed to 12 employees follow-
ing a FWO investigation, but then secretly demanded his staff return thousands 
of dollars to him and his wife.36 
 
 30 Pranay Alawala, Supplementary Submission No 59.1 to Senate Education and Employment 
References Committee, Inquiry into the Impact of Australia’s Temporary Work Visa Programs 
on the Australian Labour Market and on the Temporary Work Visa Holders (22 September 2015) 
1–2; Evidence to Education and Employment References Committee, Senate, Melbourne, 24 
September 2015, 23 (Ussama Waseem), 24 (Nikhil Kumar Sangareddypeta); Inquiry into 7-
Eleven (n 28) 11. 
 31 Interview with Former 7-Eleven Employees (Focus Group, Brisbane, 16 June 2016). 
 32 Courtney Wilson, ‘“He Made Me Scared”: 7-Eleven Worker Speaks of Intimidation, 47 Cents 
per Hour Wage’, ABC News (Online, 17 February 2016) <www.abc.net.au/news/2016-02- 
16/7-eleven-worker-speaks-of-intimidation/7174896>, archived at <https://perma.cc/S6XX-
HZ6P>. 
 33 Fair Work Ombudsman v Bosen Pty Ltd (Magistrates’ Court of Victoria, Magistrate Hawkins, 
21 April 2011) [24] (‘The Defendants took advantage of the Employees’ status as international 
students who had recently arrived in Australia on student visas … [and] made out that they 
were “doing them a favour” by only recording half the hours worked which made payslips look 
like the Employees were receiving double the flat rate they actually received’); Inquiry into 7-
Eleven (n 28) 19. 
 34 A National Disgrace (n 7) 227 [8.117]. Cf FW Act (n 26) ss 535, 536(2); Fair Work Regulations 
2009 (Cth) regs 3.44–3.46. 
 35 See Mai (n 27) [142]. Cf FW Act (n 26) s 325 (an employer must not unreasonably require an 
employee to spend any part of their wages (including by repayment to the employer)). Courts 
have previously addressed this practice in relation to temporary migrant employees within 
other businesses: Han v Mount Gambier Chinese Medical Centre [2007] SAIRC 75, [51]. 
 36 Mai (n 27) [83]–[90]. 
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Fourth, some franchisees had 7-Eleven head office pay all employees’ wages 
into their own bank account for distribution to the employees. This gave each 
franchisee a free hand to control the wage rates they paid and resulted in un-
derpayments.37 For example, over a four-year period, one franchisee had $3.6 
million in wages for 90 employees paid into 20 of his own bank accounts.38 
As these practices emerged in the media, so did a host of other complaints. 
These ranged from unpaid superannuation, to unsafe working conditions,  
uncompensated workplace injuries,39 and employees being required to pay  
the franchisee if a customer shoplifted or drove off without paying for petrol.40 
Another pattern of fraud related to 457 visa sponsorships, with franchisees 
charging international students $30,000 to $70,000 to act as a sponsor.41 FWO 
commenced proceedings against one franchisee who was barred by the DIBP 
from sponsoring 457 visas because of wage underpayments of its current 457 
visa holders.42 
It became clear that, for some time, 7-Eleven had been aware of underpay-
ments and other misconduct by franchisees, and profited from them. 7-Eleven 
had been notified about systemic exploitative practices over a number years da-
ting back to at least the time of Ullat Thodi’s complaint in 2008, and from 2012, 
by community advocate Michael Fraser, who undertook a probing investigation 
of franchises across the country and alerted Fairfax media.43 In its inquiry into 
7-Eleven in 2016, the FWO found that 7-Eleven head office had ‘very high lev-
els of control across their network’ and were ‘more closely involved in employ-
ment related matters than [the regulator had] typically encountered with other 
franchise arrangements’.44 At the very least, ‘since the FWO’s audits in 2009, 
 
 37 The Fels Wage Fairness Panel identified that approximately $77 million in wages, for approxi-
mately 1,500 workers, was paid into employers’ bank accounts: Evidence to Education and 
Employment References Committee, Senate, Canberra, 5 February 2016, 29 (Allan Fels, Fels 
Wage Fairness Panel). 
 38 Ibid. 
 39 Alawala, Supplementary Submission (n 30) 10–11; Evidence to Education and Employment 
References Committee, Senate, Melbourne, 24 September 2015, 11 (Pranay Krishna Alawala). 
 40 Alawala, Supplementary Submission (n 30) 8; Evidence to Education and Employment Refer-
ences Committee, Senate, Melbourne, 24 September 2015, 23 (Ussama Waseem). Cf FW Act 
(n 26) s 325 (an employer must not unreasonably require an employee to spend any part of 
their wages (including by repayment to the employer)); see also at ss 323–4. 
 41 Evidence to Education and Employment References Committee, Senate, Melbourne, 24 Sep-
tember 2015, 1–2 (Mohamed Rashid Ullat Thodi), 21 (Ussama Waseem). 
 42 Haider (n 26). Haider Enterprises Pty Ltd was subject to a two-year bar from sponsoring 457 
visa holders in August 2014: 1403464 [2014] MRTA 1864, [11], [102]–[103]. 
 43 Interview with Michael Fraser (Phone, 2 May 2016). 
 44 Inquiry into 7-Eleven (n 28) 32. 
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and reinforced by the Bosen litigation commenced in 2010, 7-Eleven had infor-
mation that some stores within its network had engaged in deliberate attempts 
to underpay workers’.45 Moreover, under the franchise agreement at that time, 
in which 7-Eleven head office took 57% of each store’s net profit,46 ‘the signifi-
cant underpayment of wages has directly benefited 7-Eleven’.47 
III   7-E L E V E N ’S  ES TA B L I S H M E N T  O F  WO R K E R   
R E M E D IA L  ME C HA N I S M S 
On 31 August 2015, the day the Four Corners program aired, head office Chair-
man Russell Withers announced his intention to establish an independent 
scheme to rectify underpayments from all current and former 7-Eleven em-
ployees. Allan Fels, inaugural chair of the Australian Competition and Con-
sumer Commission (‘ACCC’), was appointed as the chair of a panel which be-
came known as the Fels Wage Fairness Panel (‘Fels Panel’). Withers committed 
head office to settling any claims determined by the Fels Panel ‘promptly and 
without further investigation’ with no statute of limitations and no financial cap 
on individual or aggregate claims.48 7-Eleven engaged Deloitte Australia as sec-
retariat to provide ‘specialist investigation and forensic accounting services’ to 
the Fels Panel.49 Deloitte accountants undertook time-consuming forensic 
analyses, piecing together information in light of claimants’ limited evidence, 
making reasonable inferences based on knowledge of systemic franchisee prac-
tices, and conducting further investigation as necessary.50 
In May 2016, 7-Eleven announced that it would replace the Fels Panel with 
an internal independent unit to administer the WRP.51 According to 7-Eleven 
head office CEO Angus McKay (who replaced Russell Withers), the reason for 
moving the program in-house was to enable 7-Eleven to work directly with 
 
 45 Ibid 66. 
 46 Ibid 38. 
 47 Ibid 39. 
 48 Evidence to Education and Employment References Committee, Senate, Melbourne, 24 Sep-
tember 2015, 46; see also at 51. 
 49 A National Disgrace (n 7) 242 [8.177]. According to Allan Fels, the panel used a team of 30–40 
Deloitte forensic accountants: Interview with Allan Fels (Melbourne, 29 March 2016). See also 
Interview with 7-Eleven Management and Deloitte Representative (Melbourne, 21 February 
2017). 
 50 Interview with Allan Fels (Melbourne, 29 March 2016). 
 51 7-Eleven Media Centre (Media Statement No 11052016, 11 May 2016) <www.7eleven.com. 
au/media-centre/article/media-statement-11052016>, archived at <https://perma.cc/37K5-
NS9L>. 
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Deloitte to ensure consistent treatment of claims and the correct identity of 
claimants.52 7-Eleven treated the Fels Panel and the WRP as a single process,53 
and all claims pending with the panel were transferred to the WRP, which con-
tinued to accept new claims for a further eight months to 31 January 2017. 
Deloitte continued administering and investigating claims, dedicating ap-
proximately 60 staff each week.54 The WRP had the stated objective of providing 
redress to employees ‘in a fair, efficient, consistent and timely manner’,55 based 
on a set of guidance principles and detailed claims assessment methodology 
which Deloitte and 7-Eleven created together.56 The methodology addressed 
different fact scenarios (such as cash-back, half-pay, and unpaid training) and 
was regularly revised as novel practices of exploitation were detected.57 Alt-
hough the FWO rejected 7-Eleven’s offer to provide the regulator with addi-
tional funding to oversee the WRP,58 the FWO played a significant role in over-
seeing the WRP’s principles and methodology.59 The principles are publicly 
available; however, 7-Eleven has declined to share its assessment methodology 
due to concerns this could enable fraudulent claims.60 
Claimants were required only to submit a ‘completed template outlining the 
hours’ they worked, along with a certified copy of their identity documents and 
proof of address.61 Once an employee’s hours were established, Deloitte calcu-
lated the amount owing based on the applicable pay rates. Deloitte then pro-
vided approximately 50–100 case reports per week to the group within 7-Eleven 
 
 52 Interview with 7-Eleven Management and Deloitte Representative (Melbourne, 21 February 
2017). 
 53 Ibid. 
 54 Ibid. 
 55 7-Eleven Wage Repayment Program, ‘7-Eleven Asserts Facts around Wage Repayment  
Program and Encourages Claimants to Come Forward’ (Media Release, 30 August 2016) 
<www.wagerepaymentprogram.com.au/7-eleven-asserts-wage-repayment-program-facts-
and-encourages-claimants-to-come-forward/>, archived at <https://perma.cc/RS38-QNRW>. 
 56 Proactive Compliance Deed between the Commonwealth and 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd, 6 De-
cember 2016, cl 2.10. 
 57 Interview with 7-Eleven Management and Deloitte Representative (Melbourne, 21 February 
2017). 
 58 FWO, ‘Statement on 7-Eleven’ (Media Release No 6091, 12 May 2016). 
 59 Interview with 7-Eleven Management and Deloitte Representative (Melbourne, 21 February 
2017). 
 60 Ibid. 
 61 7-Eleven Media Centre, ‘Proactive Compliance Deed Next Step in 7-Eleven’s Reform Journey’ 
(Media Release, 7 December 2016) <www.7eleven.com.au/media-centre/article/proactive-
compliance-deed-next-step-in-7-eleven-s-reform-journey>, archived at <https://perma.cc/ 
3TBT-A7HP>. 
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management that made the ultimate payout determinations.62 The group was 
provided with the facts of the claim and determination basis but not the iden-
tities of the employee or franchisee. These details were shared only with the six 
7-Eleven staff responsible for paying the claims, who were bound by strict con-
fidentiality agreements.63 The WRP approved the substantial majority of claims. 
It rejected approximately 200 claims for being fraudulent or grossly overstated, 
including fraudulent claims by franchisees, and claims made by ‘ecosystems’ of 
employees whose only source of validation was each other’s claims.64 
Those ‘who disagree[d] with the outcome of a claim [could] seek review by 
the WRP and further review by the [FWO]’.65 In most such cases, employees 
requested reconsideration in light of particular factors and an agreement was 
reached.66 In ‘a handful or two’ of cases employees did not accept the final  
determination.67 Once an employee accepted a determination, 7-Eleven with-
held tax, deducted relevant state workers compensation levies and provided  
the employee with the remainder.68 The employee’s superannuation was also 
paid into their nominated fund.69 Based on an agreement with the Australian 
Taxation Office, tax was deducted at a flat rate of 32.5%. Interest was calculated 
at the cash rate of 1.5% — lower than the Federal Court Rate of the cash rate 
plus 4%.70 
 
 62 The committee includes the head office CEO and the General Manager Commercial and Busi-
ness Assurance: Interview with 7-Eleven Management and Deloitte Representative (Mel-
bourne, 21 February 2017). 
 63 Ibid. 
 64 Ibid. 
 65 FWO, ‘7-Eleven Signs On with Fair Work Ombudsman to Set the Standard for Franchising in 
Australia’ (Media Release No 6841, 7 December 2016). 
 66 Interview with 7-Eleven Management and Deloitte Representative (Melbourne, 21 February 
2017). 
 67 Ibid. 
 68 Ibid. While unpaid superannuation may not have been the most serious complaint for these 
workers, hundreds of millions of dollars of superannuation remains unremitted in Australia. 
Through this step, the WRP demonstrated the viability of compliance with Anderson and 
Hardy’s recommendation that enforcement models avoid shifting the burden of recouping un-
paid superannuation to employees: Helen Anderson and Tess Hardy, ‘Who Should Be the Su-
per Police? Detection and Recovery of Unremitted Superannuation’ (2014) 37 University of  
New South Wales Law Journal 162. 
 69 Alternatively, superannuation would be placed with the Retail Employees Superannuation 
Trust (‘REST’): Interview with 7-Eleven Management and Deloitte Representative (Mel-
bourne, 21 February 2017). 
 70 Adele Ferguson and Sarah Danckert, ‘7-Eleven Opting for Lower Interest Rate for  
Repayments to Some Workers’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney, 7 November 2016) 
<www.smh.com.au/business/retail/7eleven-opting-for-lower-interest-rate-for-repayments-
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As of January 2018, the cumulative total payouts of the Fels Panel and the 
WRP were $151.07 million across approximately 3,667 approved claims. 
Within the first 1,994 approved claims (to 28 February 2017), the median value 
of approved claims was $26,824 as compared to the average value which was 
$39,368,71 suggesting that the majority of claims were in fact clustered around 
this lower figure, with a smaller number of substantially larger claims. 
Although 7-Eleven accepted responsibility for paying the claims, it had a 
separate agreement with its franchisees under which it reserved the right to re-
coup from them a portion of the payout above the first $25 million.72 However, 
7-Eleven noted that it would not address this issue until the payouts were con-
cluded, so as not to interfere with the administration of employees’ claims.73 
Therefore, at the time of writing it remains unclear whether, how and to what 
extent 7-Eleven would seek reimbursement from franchisees. 
The FWO entered into an extensive Proactive Compliance Deed with  
7-Eleven on 7 December 2016, which the regulator characterised as ‘set[ting] a 
new Australian standard’.74 The deed confirmed that 7-Eleven would continue 
to rectify underpayments on an uncapped basis for all claims lodged prior to 
31 January 2017.75 Employee claims lodged since 1 February 2017 have been 
handled by an Internal Investigations Unit within 7-Eleven, rather than at arm’s 
length by Deloitte.76 The Proactive Compliance deed also incorporated a range 
of preventative measures, including reforms to 7-Eleven’s payroll, employee 
record and payment systems.77 Under the Deed, 7-Eleven acknowledged  
its ‘moral and ethical responsibility’ to ensure that all franchisees comply  
 
to-some-workers-20161103-gsgzid.html>, archived at <https://perma.cc/TKV4-EP2N>. This 
discrepancy was criticised by lawyers acting for claimants on the basis that it was unfair and 
constituted further wage theft; however, 7-Eleven maintained that it was a fair rate under the 
circumstances. 
 71 Interview with 7-Eleven Management and Deloitte Representative (Melbourne, 21 February 
2017). 
 72 A National Disgrace (n 7) 234–5 [8.157]. 
 73 Interview with 7-Eleven Management and Deloitte Representative (Melbourne, 21 February 
2017). 
 74 FWO, ‘7-Eleven Signs On with Fair Work Ombudsman to Set the Standard for Franchising in 
Australia’ (n 65). A Proactive Compliance Deed, signed by both FWO and a business, sets out 
an agreement by both parties to work together to ensure compliance with workplace laws, out-
lining the steps both parties will take to ensure future compliance and rectify previous 
breaches. 
 75 Proactive Compliance Deed (n 56) cls 7.1–7.2. 
 76 Ibid cl 7.14. 
 77 Ibid cl 5. 
14 Melbourne University Law Review [Vol 41(3):Adv 
Advance Copy 
with workplace laws,78 and agreed to establish a range of auditing, risk analysis, 
reporting and other accountability measures.79 A revised franchise agreement80 
incorporated some of these reforms in addition to other measures81 that eased 
financial pressure on franchisees which likely contributed to systemic em-
ployee underpayment. 
IV  7-E L E V E N  EM P L OY E E S ’  HI S T O R I C A L LY  LI M I T E D  A C C E S S  T O  
EM P L OY M E N T  R E M E D I E S  
Given that exploitative underpayment practices were so widespread and well 
known within 7-Eleven over many years,82 one might expect that a significant 
number of employees would have sought to recoup their unpaid wages before 
the intense media attention in 2015. However, as examined in this section,  
7-Eleven employees overall sought to recover their entitlements to only a very 
limited extent. Furthermore, those who did experienced very poor outcomes 
on the whole. In Australia, employees have three avenues for claiming unpaid 
entitlements: the FWO; unions or other advocates who can support direct ap-
proaches to employers; and the courts, either with assistance from legal service-
providers or self-represented through the small claims division of the Federal 
Circuit Court (‘FCCA’) or local courts.83 Given the especially limited role of 
courts and unions, this section mainly focuses on the role of the FWO. 
 
 78 Ibid cl 3.1. 
 79 Ibid cl 6. 
 80 The agreement was concluded in October 2015 and 98.7% of stores had signed the new agree-
ment as at 31 December 2015: Evidence to Education and Employment References Committee, 
Senate, Canberra, 5 February 2016, 8, 10 (Robert Francis Baily, CEO, 7-Eleven Stores Pty Ltd). 
 81 These include a profit-sharing arrangement that is more favourable to franchisees and an in-
creased minimum income guarantee to stores: A National Disgrace (n 7) 235 [8.160]. A  
description of other elements of the new agreement can be found in A National Disgrace:  
at 237 [8.164]. 
 82 Inquiry into 7-Eleven (n 28) 49; Interview with Levitt Robinson Lawyer (Melbourne, 26 April 
2016); Interview with Former 7-Eleven Employees (Focus Group, Brisbane, 16 June 2016). 
 83 Workers may also approach their employer directly demanding their unpaid wages, or may do 
so with assistance from legal service-providers or other organisations. 
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A  Unions 
There could have been a significant role for unions in recovering 7-Eleven em-
ployees’ wages and counterbalancing the substantial power discrepancy be-
tween the employees and their employers.84 Indeed, early in 2008, Ullat Thodi 
and a small number of 7-Eleven employees were assisted by Unite, an unregis-
tered organisation representing employees in the fast food and retail sector. 
Unite assisted the 7-Eleven employees to approach the FWO collectively, which 
resulted in litigation.85 But aside from this early role played by Unite, 7-Eleven 
employees were not members of the Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees 
Association (‘SDA’) and there was a marked absence of union involvement. 
SDA attributed lack of union membership to a perception amongst interna-
tional students that unions were markers of officialdom that they should 
avoid.86 The SDA acknowledged that although it assisted anyone who came for-
ward, it had almost no members among 7-Eleven employees.87 The union ap-
peared to focus their organising efforts on larger workplaces, which were likely 
to yield a greater number of members.88 
By contrast, unions in some industries (such as meat-packing, horticulture 
and commercial cleaning) have proactively sought to recruit and represent tem-
porary migrants.89 The noticeable successes in some of these campaigns 
 
 84 On the role of unions in wage recovery generally, see Margaret Lee, ‘Regulating Enforcement 
of Workers’ Entitlements in Australia: The New Dimension of Individualisation’ (2006) 17(1) 
Labour and Industry 41, 57; Sean Cooney, John Howe and Jill Murray, ‘Time and Money under 
WorkChoices: Understanding the New Workplace Relations Act as a Scheme of Regulation’ 
(2006) 29 University of  New South Wales Law Journal 215. 
 85 See Part IV(C)(2). 
 86 ‘They were seeing a union official in the same frame as an immigration inspector’: Evidence to 
Education and Employment References Committee, Senate, Melbourne, 24 September 2015, 
22 (Gerard Dwyer, SDA). Other unions have reported that international students often ‘come 
from countries where membership of a trade union is risky (or illegal)’: National Tertiary Ed-
ucation Union, Submission No 7 to Senate Education and Employment References Committee, 
Inquiry into the Impact of Australia’s Temporary Work Visa Programs on the Australian Labour 
Market and on the Temporary Work Visa Holders 5. 
 87 Evidence to Education and Employment References Committee, Senate, Melbourne, 24 Sep-
tember 2015, 22, 26 (Gerard Dwyer, SDA). 
 88 Robert Gottliebsen, ‘Uncertainty Casts a Shadow over Major Supermarkets’, The Australian 
(Sydney, 23 August 2016) <www.theaustralian.com.au/business/opinion/robert-gottliebsen/ 
uncertainty-casts-a-shadow-over-major-supermarkets/news-
story/0a8dfc2e5dc9b17c7c4e8560fb3e941e>. 
 89 See, eg, Richard Baker, Nick McKenzie and Ben Schneiders, ‘Another Supermarket Fruit  
Supplier Caught Allegedly Underpaying Migrants’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney,  
15 November 2016) <www.smh.com.au/business/workplace-relations/another-supermarket-
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demonstrate the potential for unions to organise and empower these workers, 
even despite the fact that temporary migrants are particularly unlikely to be 
union members,90 and awareness of unions among international students ap-
pears to be low.91 These examples suggest that under different circumstances 
there may have been a greater role for the union to play in enabling 7-Eleven 
employees to claim their unpaid wages, or even in triggering the public re-
sponse that led to the establishment of the WRP. 
B  Courts 
Not a single 7-Eleven employee sought to recoup their unpaid wages by filing a 
case in court. This includes not only the ordinary divisions of the courts, which 
generally require legal representation, but also the small claims jurisdiction. 
The federal small claims jurisdiction was introduced by the FW Act in 2009 to 
provide a more accessible forum for an individual plaintiff to commence certain 
civil remedy proceedings. In a small claims procedure in the FCCA, the Court 
may act ‘in an informal manner’, ‘is not bound by [formal] rules of evidence’, 
and may act ‘without regard to legal forms and technicalitities’.92 However, in 
addition to calculating and substantiating a claim, the complexity of applica-
tions presents prohibitive barriers for most temporary migrants who would 
likely be unable to correctly identify the legal employer as well as the instru-
ment the employer has breached, and prepare necessary affidavits which must 
be served on respondents.93 Affordable legal assistance for employment claims 
is limited.94 
In the context of an acute power imbalance in court between most interna-
tional students and their employers, even those few employees in a position to 
 
fruit-supplier-caught-allegedly-underpaying-migrants-20161115-gspu0v.html>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/HH3G-RYKM>. 
 90 In the Temporary Migrants’ Access to Justice for Wage Theft in Australia report, union member-
ship was at 3% among respondents who were international students in their lowest paid job: 
Bassina Farbenblum and Laurie Berg, Temporary Migrants’ Access to Justice for Wage Theft in 
Australia (Report, forthcoming). One large-scale survey of 457 visa holders found only 7% of 
respondents to be union members (although those who were had higher satisfaction levels at 
work): Migration Council Australia, More than Temporary: Australia’s 457 Visa Program (Re-
port) 18. 
 91 Interview with International Students (Focus Group, Sydney, 13 October 2016). 
 92 FW Act (n 26) s 548(3). The small claims process can also apply in any Magistrates Court. 
 93 Chris Arup and Carolyn Sutherland, ‘The Recovery of Wages: Legal Services and Access to 
Justice’ (2009) 35 Monash University Law Review 96, 105, 108–11; Hemingway (n 11) 156. 
 94 Arup and Sutherland (n 93) 109; Interview with Legal Aid NSW Lawyers (Sydney, 8 February 
2016). 
2018] Remedies for Migrant Worker Exploitation in Australia 17 
Advance Copy 
put together a claim have an understandably bleak view of the risks and likeli-
hood of success. One 7-Eleven employee explained that after his employment 
was terminated when he protested his $5 per hour wage, he contemplated a 
judicial remedy but was told by a friend: ‘Look you’re an international student 
here and they’re a company. People have their own lawyers and things. If you 
go against them, you know what’s going to happen. You’re going to get kicked 
out of the country and you’re not going to win.’95 
C  The FWO 
The FWO and its predecessor, the Workplace Ombudsman, have been involved 
in addressing workplace contraventions at 7-Eleven since 2008. Nevertheless, 
prior to 2015 these interventions had limited impact on the recovery of unpaid 
wages by individual 7-Eleven employees. 
The FWO is the national labour inspectorate, which is tasked with promot-
ing ‘harmonious, productive and cooperative workplace relations’96 and ‘com-
pliance with [the FW Act] … including by providing education, assistance and 
advice’.97 The agency has been reinvigorated over recent years and, compared 
with its predecessors, has greater power, staffing, resources and political sup-
port to fulfil its enforcement role.98 
The FWO’s functions ‘emphasise preventative compliance (eg through edu-
cation and advice) and co-operative and voluntary compliance (eg through en-
forceable undertakings)’ over the pursuit of court proceedings or punitive ad-
ministrative remedies.99 In a major study of the FWO, Hardy, Howe and 
Cooney observed that its approach to enforcement eschews ‘command-and-
control models’, which ‘have fallen out of favour in much of the current litera-
ture on regulatory compliance’.100 Instead, the FWO’s statutory objects are 
 
 95 Interview with Former 7-Eleven Employee (Phone, 4 May 2016). 
 96 FW Act (n 26) s 682(1)(a)(i). 
 97 Ibid s 682(1)(a)(ii). See generally Tess Hardy and John Howe, ‘Accountability and the Fair 
Work Ombudsman’ (2011) 18 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 127. 
 98 Tess Hardy, ‘A Changing of the Guard: Enforcement of Workplace Relations Laws since Work 
Choices and Beyond’ in Anthony Forsyth and Andrew Stewart (eds), Fair Work: The New 
Workplace Laws and the Work Choices Legacy (Federation Press, 2009) 75. 
 99 Explanatory Memorandum, Fair Work Bill 2008 (Cth) 386 [2554]; see also at 400 [2665]; FWO, 
‘Litigation Policy of the Office of the Fair Work Ombudsman’ (Guidance Note No 1, 4th ed, 3 
December 2013). 
 100 Tess Hardy, John Howe and Sean Cooney, ‘Less Energetic but More Enlightened? Exploring 
the Fair Work Ombudsman’s Use of Litigation in Regulatory Enforcement’ (2013) 35 Sydney 
Law Review 565, 567 (citations omitted). 
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broadly geared towards ‘responsive regulation’ and ‘strategic enforcement’.101 
They adopt a mix of persuasive, reforming and deterrent sanctions to address 
drivers of noncompliance,102 often proactively pursuing high risk industries to 
maximise limited resources rather than sanctioning individual employers or 
responding reactively to workers’ complaints. 
The FWO identifies temporary migrant employees as a vulnerable popula-
tion and in recent years their working conditions have been a high-profile pri-
ority and the subject of several major FWO campaigns and inquiries.103 The FW 
Act provides the agency with wide investigatory powers to visit workplaces, in-
terview people or require the production of documents to determine if there 
have been breaches of Commonwealth workplace laws.104 The FWO can utilise 
a range of administrative sanctions when pursuing a party for a contraven-
tion.105 These include infringement notices,106 compliance notices107 and en-
forceable undertakings.108 Fair Work inspectors also have standing to seek civil 
penalties through the courts for breaches of the Act.109 
When an employee contacts the FWO, the regulator has discretion as to how 
to respond. In the vast majority of cases, individuals are referred to the FWO’s 
 
 101 ‘Strategic enforcement’ is a sophisticated approach to regulatory enforcement developed by 
David Weil: David Weil, Improving Workplace Conditions through Strategic Enforcement: A Re-
port to the Wage and Hour Division (Report, May 2010). ‘Responsive regulation’ was coined by 
Ayres and Braithwaite: Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending 
the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University Press, 1992). 
 102 See Neil Gunningham, ‘Strategizing Compliance and Enforcement: Responsive Regulation and 
beyond’ in Christine Parker and Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen (eds), Explaining Compliance: Busi-
ness Responses to Regulation (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) 199, 201. 
 103 See, eg, the FWO’s inquiry reports: Inquiry into 7-Eleven (n 28); FWO, Inquiry into Trolley 
Collection Services Procurement by Woolworths Limited (Report, June 2016); FWO, Inquiry into 
the Wages and Conditions of People Working under the 417 Working Holiday Visa Program (Oc-
tober 2016). 
 104 FW Act (n 26) ss 708–9, 711–12, 714–16. 
 105 FWO, Compliance and Enforcement Policy (Policy, August 2017) 21–6. 
 106 Fair Work Regulations 2009 (Cth) regs 4.04–4.05. Similar to an on-the-spot fine, this penalty 
can be applied to breaches related to employment records and pay slips. 
 107 FW Act (n 26) s 716. This is a written notice that legally requires an employer to fix breaches 
of the FW Act, generally issued when the employer will not voluntarily rectify the breach. 
 108 Ibid s 715. This is a legally enforceable agreement that generally commits a firm to remedy past 
contraventions and take steps to ensure future compliance, acknowledging that failure to com-
ply will likely lead to court action. 
 109 Ibid s 682(1)(d). 
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website to clarify their legal position and are encouraged to pursue further ac-
tion themselves.110 For example, the FWO may provide a template letter of de-
mand and/or a guide on the small claims process.111 Alternatively, the FWO 
may address the matter directly with the employer, or facilitate a voluntary 
phone mediation between employer and employee(s),112 although the agency 
has no obligation to achieve or enforce any particular outcome. In only a 
smaller number of cases, an individual request for assistance will trigger a for-
mal investigation.113 
Each enforcement measure is used sparingly and the chances of contraven-
tions being investigated and sanctioned remain low. Although the FWO has 
recently made greater use of litigation as both deterrent and punishment,114 the 
agency reserves legal action ‘for the most serious of matters’.115 In the 2015–16 
financial year, out of more than 13,877 complaints made to the FWO, it issued 
approximately 570 infringement notices and 180 compliance notices, entered 
into more than 40 enforceable undertakings, and initiated 50 civil penalty pro-
ceedings.116 Contraventions involving visa holders are significantly overrepre-
sented in each of these enforcement activities, relative to the size of this work-
force.117 While high by historical standards and targeted towards vulnerable 
workforces, these figures indicate that even the FWO’s focus on noncompliance 
involving temporary workers remains on future voluntary compliance rather 
than accountability for previous misconduct. In part, this trend may be due  
to difficulties in detecting noncompliance as a result of complex changes to  
the labour market over the last two decades,118 as well as limited resources  
 
 110 See generally FWO, Compliance and Enforcement Policy (n 105) 9–13. 
 111 See FWO, Small Claims Guide (Guide). 
 112 FWO, Compliance and Enforcement Policy (n 105) 11–12. 
 113 FWO, 2015–16 Fair Work Ombudsman Annual Report (Annual Report, 28 September 2016) 
17. 
 114 See Hardy, ‘A Changing of the Guard’ (n 98) 86; FWO, Compliance and Enforcement Policy  
(n 105) 25–6. 
 115 Evidence to Education and Employment References Committee, Senate, Melbourne, 18 May 
2015, 30 (Natalie James, Fair Work Ombudsman). 
 116 FWO, 2015–16 Fair Work Ombudsman Annual Report (n 113) 17, 21–2. 
 117 In 2015–16, contraventions involving visa holders accounted for 13% of dispute forms, 43% of 
enforceable undertakings, and 76% of the FWO’s court actions: ibid 1, 22. 
 118 More fragmented employment relationships and the proliferation of small workplaces have 
made detection of contraventions more difficult and legal accountability harder to establish in 
individual cases: Richard Johnstone and Michael Quinlan, ‘The OHS Regulatory Challenges 
Posed by Agency Workers: Evidence from Australia’ (2006) 28 Employee Relations 273; David 
Weil, ‘Enforcing Labour Standards in Fissured Workplaces: The US Experience’ (2011) 22 Eco-
nomic and Labour Relations Review 33. 
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and the expense of formal litigation. However, the high evidentiary standards 
adopted by the FWO also likely impede the agency’s pursuit of alleged  
contraventions, particularly when employees lack documentary evidence of 
noncompliance. As the Fair Work Ombudsman, Natalie James, has observed, 
‘[u]nless workers have meticulously kept their own records of their hours  
of work, it becomes very difficult to assess whether underpayments have 
arisen’.119 Another important factor is the FWO’s approach to complaints which 
focuses on ‘education and self-help’120 — an approach that can create significant 
barriers to obtaining redress for vulnerable employees who may require sub-
stantial assistance. 
The FWO’s functions therefore do not include systematically ensuring that 
large numbers of individual employees can recover their unpaid wages. In the 
absence of more tailored worker-focused assistance by the FWO or greater 
powers to resolve allegations of FW Act contraventions, the FWO is unable to 
provide significant numbers of temporary migrant workers with a clear path to 
remedies, as is evident from an analysis of the history of the FWO’s investiga-
tions into, and sanctions against, 7-Eleven and its franchisees. 
1 Unpaid Entitlements Recovered by the FWO from 7-Eleven Franchisees 
The former Workplace Ombudsman began investigating 7-Eleven franchises in 
2008. Following allegations of the ‘half pay scam’ brought by Ullat Thodi and 
his co-employees that year,121 the Ombudsman and its successor, the FWO, 
conducted two campaigns which involved dozens of audits between 2008 and 
2010. The two agencies recovered voluntarily from employers $162,000 for 168 
employees at 20 stores (approximately $960 per employee).122 In a further edu-
cation and audit campaign of 56 franchisees, the FWO found that 30% of fran-
chises had contravened the FW Act, and the agency recovered $32,378 for 62 
 
 119 Natalie James, ‘Current Issues in the Regulation of Australian Workplaces’ (Speech, Australian 
Industry Group 2017 Annual National Policy-Influence-Reform Conference, 1 May 2017) 2. 
For discussion of evidentiary standards in relation to the FWO’s implementation of other ad-
ministrative sanctions such as enforceable undertakings, see John Howe, Tess Hardy and Sean 
Cooney, The Transformation of Enforcement of Minimum Employment Standards in Australia: 
A Review of the FWO’s Activities from 2006–2012 (Report, Centre for Employment and Labour 
Relations Law, University of Melbourne) 196–7. 
 120 FWO, Compliance and Enforcement Policy (n 105) 9. In the 2015–16 financial year, 98% of calls 
to the FWO infoline were resolved at the first point of contact: FWO, 2015–16 Fair Work Om-
budsman Annual Report (n 113) 9. 
 121 Interview with Unite Organiser (Phone, 5 May 2016). 
 122 Inquiry into 7-Eleven (n 28) 7–8. 
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employees (approximately $500 per employee).123 The FWO has since acknowl-
edged that these outcomes likely understated levels of noncompliance since its 
audit methodology at that time ‘would not have identified underpayments if 
false records were provided’.124 
These earlier audits and enforcement actions appear to have had little im-
pact on the entrenched underpayment practices within 7-Eleven franchises. 
Between 2011 and 2015, the FWO received 54 further requests for assistance 
from 7-Eleven employees.125 Despite the high proportion of the 7-Eleven work-
force who were visa holders, only half of the 54 requests for FWO assistance 
were from visa holders,126 suggesting that this group was significantly un-
derrepresented among those willing to approach the FWO with complaints. 
Moreover, data supplied by the FWO reveals relatively poor outcomes for these 
27 visa holders. Eleven cases (39%) involved investigations with no outcome.127 
Nine (32%) were resolved through voluntary compliance measures, all yielding 
small amounts of money. In five cases (19%), the FWO completed an investiga-
tion. Three of these resulted in recovery of money for the employee, one was 
resolved by litigation with no money recovered, and another resulted in a com-
pliance notice with $668 recovered.128 
In 2014, the FWO then commenced its large-scale inquiry into the 7-Eleven 
network and published its report in 2016. The inquiry involved unannounced 
site inspections and record-keeping analysis of 20 stores as well as closer inves-
tigations of specific stores that had been the subject of employee complaints.129 
This time, the FWO uncovered ‘deliberate manipulation of records to disguise 
underpayment[s]’.130 The findings prompted the FWO to file 7 matters in the 
FCCA;131 enter into 1 enforceable undertaking; issue 20 letters of caution, 14 
 
 123 Ibid 8–9. 
 124 Ibid 9. 
 125 Ibid 11. 
 126 Ibid. 
 127 These were either not completed, had complaints withdrawn by the complainant, or had no 
outcome because of insufficient evidence. 
 128 FWO, ‘FWO Compliance History with “7 Eleven” Stores, 1 Jul 2011 to 30 Jun 2015’ (Analysis, 
FWO Strategic Research Analysis and Reporting Team) (provided directly to the authors on 4 
April 2016). 
 129 Inquiry into 7-Eleven (n 28) 4. 
 130 Ibid. 
 131 See Part IV(C)(2). 
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infringement notices and 3 compliance notices; and led to the recovery of over 
$293,500 for an unknown number of employees.132 
2 Litigation Brought by the FWO against 7-Eleven Franchisees 
The first legal proceedings against 7-Eleven franchisees were commenced by 
the FWO in early 2010. These cases arose from the first ‘half pay scam’ com-
plaints against the owners and operators of two 7-Eleven stores, brought by 
Ullat Thodi and his co-employees. In April 2011, the Magistrates’ Court of Vic-
toria awarded penalties of $120,000 against Bosen Pty Ltd and $20,000 and 
$10,000 respectively against directors Hao Chen and Xue Jing.133 The $30,000 
in penalties paid by the directors was distributed amongst the six international 
student employees but a further $70,068.02 in outstanding entitlements was 
never recouped against Bosen, which was wound up as insolvent in Federal 
Court proceedings in June 2012.134 
The FWO has filed eight cases in total against 7-Eleven franchise owner cor-
porations and their directors and managers.135 Together, these cases illuminate 
the FWO’s approach to litigation, and several trends in the impact and out-
comes of litigation for employees. First, it appears that none of the cases arose 
 
 132 Ibid. 
 133 Bosen (n 33) [68]–[70]. 
 134 Inquiry into 7-Eleven (n 28) 10. 
 135 At the time of writing, a decision has been handed down in seven cases: Bosen (n 33); Haider 
(n 26) (a former employee was underpaid $21,298.86 but because of the involuntary liquida-
tion of the company there was ‘little to no chance’ he would ever be paid (at [29]); the Court 
imposed penalty of $6,120 for Notice to Produce contravention and $850 for the Compliance 
Notice contravention on the director, and ordered the total amount of $6,790 be paid to the 
former employee); Amritsaria Four (n 27) (two employees claimed underpayments of $49,000 
and $5,682 respectively, which were rectified prior to hearing; the Court imposed penalties of 
$178,500 on the company and $35,750 on the director and ordered a full independent audit 
and employment law training); Mai (n 27) (12 employees were underpaid a total of $82,661, 
which the employer purported to rectify in response to the Contravention Notice but then 
required employees to pay a portion of these wages back; the Court imposed record penalties 
of $340,290 on the company and $68,058 on the director); Fair Work Ombudsman v Hiyi Pty 
Ltd [2016] FCCA 1634 (12 employees were underpaid a total of $84,047.32, which was rectified 
prior to the decision; the Court imposed penalties of $110,000 on the company and $20,000 
on each of the two directors); Fair Work Ombudsman v JS Top Pty Ltd [2017] FCCA 1689 (eight 
staff underpaid a total of $19,397.15, rectified before trial; the Court imposed penalties of 
$28,000 on owner and $140,000 on company); Fair Work Ombudsman v Viplus Pty Ltd [2017] 
FCCA 1669 (Jason Yuan and his two companies Vipper Pty Ltd and Viplus Pty Ltd underpaid 
21 employees more than $31,000). A further case remains pending: FWO, ‘Brisbane 7-Eleven 
Outlet Faces Court Action’ (n 27) (facing legal proceedings is Avinash Pratap Singh and his 
company S & A Enterprises (Qld) Pty Ltd for allegedly underpaying two international students 
$5,593). 
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because international students currently employed at 7-Eleven approached the 
FWO. Second, in four cases, the employees’ underpayments had already been 
rectified,136 and the purpose of the litigation was to pursue penalties against the 
owner corporations and their directors for FW Act contraventions.137 Third, in 
two of the three cases in which the court ordered the owner corporation to rec-
tify underpayments to employees, the corporation was declared insolvent and 
never repaid the employees. Fourth, the FWO pursued litigation in response to 
employee-initiated complaints only in cases in which there was substantial 
physical evidence of wrongdoing, such as the case of Ullat Thodi, who main-
tained copious records of his own, given, as he described, his compulsive ‘habit 
of writing everything down’.138 It is questionable whether the FWO would have 
acted on a complaint by an employee who either had no pay slips or only had 
fraudulent pay slips with no further evidence of underpayment. Finally, litiga-
tion was always a lengthy process, with a wait of approximately one year be-
tween when the misconduct came to the FWO’s attention and the instigation 
of litigation, and approximately another year from the commencement of liti-
gation until judgment.139 It appears from these cases that litigation by the FWO 
is generally a blunt, slow tool for wage recovery by individuals. It is not possible 
to evaluate the deterrence impact of the far higher penalties obtained in more 
recent cases as these occurred after 7-Eleven had already begun overhauling its 
franchise practices. Still, the fact remains that, in many of the 50-odd cases that 
the FWO brings to court each year, the penalties are small relative to the finan-
cial rewards of significant underpayment.140 
 
 136 Amritsaria Four (n 27) [22]; Hiyi (n 135) [8]; JS Top (n 135) [18]–[19]; FWO, ‘Brisbane 7-
Eleven Outlet Faces Court Action’ (n 27). 
 137 These included orders requiring future independent auditing, employment law training and 
placement of signs in the workplace advising employees of their rights: see, eg, Amritsaria Four 
(n 27); Mai (n 27). 
 138 Evidence to Education and Employment References Committee, Senate, Melbourne, 24 Sep-
tember 2015, 3 (Mohamed Rashid Ullat Thodi). 
 139 See, eg, Haider (n 26); Amritsaria Four (n 27); Mai (n 27); Hiyi (n 135); JS Top (n 135). 
 140 Introduced on 1 March 2017, the Fair Work Amendment (Protecting Vulnerable Workers) Bill 
2017 (Cth) proposes increasing the maximum civil penalty to 600 penalty units for certain 
serious contraventions of the FW Act: at pt 1. The Bill also proposes making franchisors and 
holding companies responsible for certain contraventions committed by their franchisees or 
subsidiaries where they knew or ought reasonably to have known and failed to take reasonable 
steps to prevent them: at pt 2. In addition, it increases the power of Fair Work inspectors to 
gather evidence, and prohibits the obstruction of Fair Work inspectors or the provision of false 
or misleading information or documents: at pts 4–6. 
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After the media revelations emerged in August 2015, the FWO engaged 
more actively with 7-Eleven by supporting the businesses’ efforts to address ex-
ploitative franchisee practices and repay employees, most notably through the 
Proactive Compliance Deed discussed in Part III. Nevertheless, it is striking to 
compare the wage rectifications obtained by the FWO prior to these develop-
ments (through its audits, voluntary resolutions or full investigations), with the 
wage recovery under the WRP. This includes the WRP’s overall recovery 
amount ($151.07 million as of January 2018), the WRP’s total number of ap-
proved employee claims (3,667) and the median value of the first 1,994 ap-
proved claims ($26,824).141 
The FWO’s limited enforcement outcomes undoubtedly reflect the agency’s 
preference for voluntary and forward-looking dispute resolution over punitive 
sanctions. They are also partly attributable to 7-Eleven employees’ unwilling-
ness to assist the FWO’s investigations.142 In the regulator’s investigation of one 
7-Eleven franchise in September 2014, only 1 out of 10 employees were willing 
to participate in a formal interview.143 Other international students who spoke 
to the FWO during its broader inquiry lied that they had received proper pay-
ments or disclosed their underpayments but later recanted this testimony.144  
This is consistent with international students’ general reluctance to recover 
their entitlements or engage with the FWO. In the National Temporary Migrant 
Work Survey, of the 1,296 international student survey participants who recog-
nised they were underpaid, only 6% had sought to recover unpaid wages and 
only 1% (19 respondents) had tried to contact the FWO.145 These low figures 
are similarly reflected in the regulator’s complaints data: of the 2,163 workplace 
dispute forms that the FWO received from temporary migrants in financial year 
2014–15, just 8% were from international students, compared with 43% from 
working holiday makers, although international students comprised 45% of the 
temporary visa workforce.146 In the next section, we explore in more detail the 
barriers inhibiting international students lodging complaints or claims, and the 
features of the WRP which facilitated such dramatically improved outcomes for 
this same group of vulnerable workers. 
 
 141 See 7-Eleven Wage Repayment Program (n 10) (at ‘Claim Determination’). 
 142 Inquiry into 7-Eleven(n 28) 25, 56, 72. 
 143 Ibid 21. 
 144 See ibid 47. 
 145 Farbenblum and Berg (n 90). 
 146 FWO, Fair Work Ombudsman Annual Report 2014–15 (Annual Report, 28 September 2015) 
39. As at 30 September 2016, there were 470,810 student visa holders in Australia out of 
1,151,030 temporary visa holders (excluding New Zealand citizens): DIBP, Temporary Entrants 
and New Zealand Citizens in Australia: As at 30 September 2016 (Report, 2016) 1. 
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V  F E AT U R E S  O F  T H E  7-EL E V E N  WRP  T HAT  ENA B L E D  EM P L OY E E S  
T O  OBTA I N  R E DR E S S :  HO W  WE R E  SH O RT C O M I N G S   
O F  EX I S T I N G  PR O C E S S E S  OV E R C O M E ? 
The WRP achieved a historic feat in enabling the recovery of more than $150 
million by thousands of temporary migrant workers. The WRP had clear ad-
vantages over existing mechanisms, not least because it operated in a non-ad-
versarial context, was underpinned by 7-Eleven’s acceptance of full responsi-
bility for the underpayments and its commitment to accepting the determina-
tions of the WRP in repaying its franchisees’ employees.147 In addition to its 
remedial purpose, 7-Eleven was invested in the WRP as both a way to under-
stand and address problems in its business, and to build trust with current fran-
chise employees so they would alert management to misconduct in the fu-
ture.148 However, these factors alone do not account for the WRP’s efficacy in 
overcoming the vulnerabilities and structural barriers that ordinarily inhibit 
temporary migrant workers’ access to remedies.149 This section seeks to unpack 
the features of the WRP that made employee claims possible where existing 
mechanisms had for the most part failed. 
A  Mitigation of Employees’ Immigration Fears 
The WRP addressed two key fears that inhibit international students’ willing-
ness to engage with the FWO or bring claims against their employer. First, the 
WRP addressed international students’ fear of jeopardising their immigration 
status and authorisation to remain in Australia. As one former 7-Eleven em-
ployee put it, ‘there’s this notion among students that Fair Works and Immi-
gration work together, so as soon as you get some information to the Fair 
Works, it’s already gone to the Immigration’.150 Most student visas contain visa 
condition 8105 permitting up to 40 hours work per fortnight while the visa 
holder’s course is in session, breach of which constitutes a discretionary ground 
 
 147 Head office CEO Angus McKay confirmed that franchisee employees ‘were, under our watch, 
not paid the correct amount of money and we have then sought to get them back to where they 
would have been, had they been paid correctly on day one’: Interview with 7-Eleven Manage-
ment and Deloitte Representative (Melbourne, 21 February 2017). 
 148 According to head office CEO Angus McKay, the remedial process was not a generous gesture, 
but rather a way for the company to demonstrate that ‘we intend to do the right thing [and] 
deliver on that every time we deal with either an ex- or a current employee’: ibid. 
 149 Alexander Reilly, ‘Protecting Vulnerable Migrant Workers: The Case of International Students’ 
(2012) 25 Australian Journal of Labour Law 181, 187–8; Berg (n 8) 124–5. 
 150 Interview with Former 7-Eleven Employee (Melbourne, 29 April 2016). 
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for visa cancellation and removal from Australia in the middle of the student’s 
studies.151 At 7-Eleven, many international students routinely worked over this 
limit to compensate for being paid approximately half the hourly rate.152 While 
the actual likelihood of visa cancellation was small, even a possibility of this 
outcome profoundly shaped international students’ behaviour. Several wit-
nesses before the Senate committee inquiry emphasised the critical importance 
of a complete visa amnesty for international students to report exploitation 
while working at 7-Eleven.153 Ullat Thodi observed: 
They are all scared to stand up because of the [previous] 20 hour [per week] work 
limit. I believe that if Immigration say in the newspaper that the 20 hour limit 
does not apply, people will just run in behind it, and you could get thousands of 
people right now saying, ‘Yes, I have been underpaid’.154  
An advocate similarly reported being told by an informant close to Indian and 
Pakistani communities that ‘these 7-Eleven workers want to come forward, but 
they want the piece of paper. You bring that piece of paper that says they won’t 
get in trouble, and you will be blown away by how many thousands come for-
ward.’155 Students who have not violated visa condition 8105 themselves may 
also stay silent in order to protect co-workers. As one former 7-Eleven em-
ployee reported, ‘if I have to go forward and tell them what’s happening, I’m 
going to put everyone into trouble’.156 
 
 151 Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) sch 8, visa condition 8105(1). Visa condition 8104 prohibits 
family members of the primary visa holder from working more than 40 hours per fortnight at 
any time. For visa cancellation powers, see Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 116; Migration Regula-
tions 1994 (Cth) reg 2.43. Until 2012, visa condition 8105 stipulated a 20-hour-per-week limi-
tation on work, until the Act was amended by Migration Legislation Amendment Regulation 
2012 (No 5) (Cth) sch 5. 
 152 Alison Branley, ‘7-Eleven Staff Work Twice as Long at Half Pay Rate, Investigation Reveals’, 
ABC News (Online, 29 August 2015) <www.abc.net.au/news/2015-08-29/7-eleven-half-pay-
scam-exposed/6734174>, archived at <https://perma.cc/QYJ7-MM9A>. 
 153 Mohamed Rashid Ullat Thodi and Pranay Alawala, Submission No 59 to Senate Education and 
Employment References Committee, Inquiry into the Impact of Australia’s Temporary Work 
Visa Programs on the Australian Labour Market and on the Temporary Work Visa Holders (22 
September 2015) 8 [81]. 
 154 Evidence to Education and Employment References Committee, Senate, Melbourne, 24 Sep-
tember 2015, 6. 
 155 Ibid 16 (Michael Fraser). 
 156 Interview with Former 7-Eleven Employee (Melbourne, 29 April 2016). 
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Employers’ threats to report unauthorised work to the DIBP have been well 
documented in policy and academic literature as a key driver of exploitation.157 
However, in the case of 7-Eleven, even absent such explicit threats, interna-
tional students were fearful of reporting noncompliance.158 Although employ-
ers could also be subject to penalty under the Migration Act for their role in the 
breach of student visa conditions, international students knew it was more 
likely that penalties for noncompliance would be imposed on them than their 
employer, and the consequences would be far more severe.159 At the same time, 
some students erroneously perceived that they had no legitimate ground for 
complaint because they had acquiesced to poor working conditions,160 and 
were therefore ‘complicit’ in ‘arrangements that contravened workplace rela-
tions and immigration laws’.161 
The WRP addressed employees’ immigration-related fear in two fundamen-
tal ways. First, the WRP had the benefit of an assurance by the DIBP that the 
DIBP would not cancel 7-Eleven employees’ visas ‘for breaches of visa work 
conditions if the employee made a claim or [was] assisting the [WRP] or the 
FWO and ha[d] committed no further breaches’.162 In mid-2017, this was ex-
panded into a general assurance applicable to all international students and 
 
 157 Reilly, ‘Protecting Vulnerable Migrant Workers’ (n 149) 191, quoting Michael Knight, Strategic 
Review of the Student Visa Program 2011 (Report, Commonwealth of Australia, 30 June 2011) 
85. Cf the notorious case of Jones v Hanssen Pty Ltd [2008] FMCA 291, where the employer 
acknowledged that 457 visa holders ‘would sign anything” because they “are frightened of … 
being sent back”’: at [8] (citations omitted). 
 158 On the important role paid by workers’ perceptions of their insecurity, even if not realistic or 
likely, see Boese et al (n 12) 330. See generally Claudia Tazreiter et al, Fluid Security in the Asia 
Pacific: Transnational Lives, Human Rights and State Control (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). 
 159 Although employers found to have employed a non-citizen in breach of their visa face civil and 
criminal sanctions under s 245AB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), employers’ lack of concern 
about such consequences appears reasonable given that the DIBP has shown no inclination to 
pursue penalties against franchisees and, in any event, the financial penalties are small com-
pared with the financial gains from breaches of workplace laws: Interview with Former 7-
Eleven Employees (Focus Group, Brisbane, 16 June 2016). 
 160 Of the underpaid international students in the Temporary Migrants’ Access to Justice for Wage 
Theft in Australia report who had not made a claim, 26% said that a reason for not pursuing a 
claim is that they had agreed to the pay rate: Farbenblum and Berg (n 90). 
 161 In its inquiry report on 7-Eleven, the FWO described a ‘culture of complicity’ between fran-
chisees and employees: Inquiry into 7-Eleven (n 28) 32. 
 162 Ibid 58 (citations omitted). This followed more informal assurances, less directly communi-
cated to 7-Eleven employees. For instance, in October 2015, the Deputy Secretary, Visa and 
Cancellation Services, of the DIBP stated at Senate Estimates that in respect of 7-Eleven Em-
ployees ‘who have come forward to assist the Fair Work Ombudsman with their inquiries … 
there will be no action taken against them from a visa cancellation point of view’: Evidence to 
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other visa holders with work rights, as discussed in Part VII. Second, the WRP 
issued its own assurance that it would not require or obtain information on 
claimants’ visa status, and would disclose claimants’ names only to head office 
for the sole purpose of the final rectification payment. 7-Eleven management 
officials observed that they had deliberately tried to differentiate the company 
from immigration authorities, with the message that ‘if you don’t feel comfort-
able ringing the authorities, you should be ringing us, and we will look after 
you’.163 This distinguished the process from court proceedings, which are al-
ways public, and from the unpredictability of the FWO’s discretion at that time 
to request an assurance against visa cancellation from the DIBP164 (and the ex-
ercise of the DIBP’s discretionary visa cancellation power).165 
Even with the WRP’s safeguards, some employees remained scared of im-
migration consequences and were ‘watching and waiting’ to see the outcome of 
claims filed by other employees before filing their own.166 Many informants 
(employees, unions, other advocates and Fels himself) maintained that the fire-
wall between the WRP and DIBP and the fact that no claimant’s visa was can-
celled were the most potent factors in encouraging hesitant students to come 
forward. However, all also observed that potentially thousands more claims 
would have been made if the assurance had been stronger and communicated 
more forcefully from the outset.167 
 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee, Senate, 19 October 2015, 194 (Mi-
chael Manthorpe). 
 163 Interview with 7-Eleven Management and Deloitte Representative (Melbourne, 21 February 
2017). 
 164 Natalie James notes that as a matter of practice, FWO does not refer employee visa breaches to 
the DIBP: Evidence to Education and Employment Legislation Committee, Senate, Canberra, 
2 March 2017, 79. Indeed, when approached by the unregistered union, Unite, the FWO re-
quested immigration assurances in relation to Ullat Thodi and the other workers to assuage 
their concerns about engaging with the regulator: Interview with Unite Organiser (Phone, 5 
May 2016). 
 165 See Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 116. 
 166 Interview with Michael Fraser (Phone, 2 May 2016). 
 167 Evidence to Education and Employment References Committee, Senate, Melbourne, 24 Sep-
tember 2015, 6 (Mohamed Rashid Ullat Thodi), 22 (Gerard Dwyer, SDA); Interview with Allan 
Fels (Melbourne, 29 March 2016); Interview with Michael Fraser (Phone, 2 May 2016). 
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B  Mitigation of Fears of Loss of Employment or  
Retaliation and Disloyalty Concerns 
The guarantee of confidentiality also ameliorated employees’ second significant 
fear: loss of employment if their franchise employer learned about their com-
plaint.168 Unlike adversarial FWO or judicial processes, the WRP was able to 
assure claimants that their names would not be made public nor disclosed to 
franchisees.169 Despite some early reports of leaks from 7-Eleven head office to 
certain franchisees, claimants generally trusted the anonymity of the WRP pro-
cess, which was often essential to their willingness to make a claim.170 
Loss of employment is deeply feared by many international students because 
it can jeopardise substantial financial, social and other investments they have 
made to complete their studies in Australia. Without entitlement to social se-
curity benefits, unemployment may be devastating for international students, 
particularly those who depend on their employment income and believe that 
they will be unable to find another job.171 As one employee put it, ‘first thing 
you’ll do, you’re going to think about your food. You have to stay here, you have 
studies, you have to make money. You’re not going to believe anything else.’172 
Maurice Blackburn reports that one 7-Eleven employee who approached them 
for assistance ‘worked across three separate 7-Eleven stores simultaneously to 
pay back [their] education loan, sometimes working 110 hours per week at half 
the appropriate Award rates’.173 
Discrimination at the point of entry into the labour market may further 
contribute to international students’ ‘willingness to accept inferior working 
 
 168 Interview with Michael Fraser (Phone, 2 May 2016). 
 169 7-Eleven Wage Repayment Program (n 10) (at ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, ‘Claims Process’). 
 170 Interview with Former 7-Eleven Employee (29 April 2016); Interview with Former 7-Eleven 
Employees (Focus Group, Brisbane, 16 June 2016). 
 171 See Berg (n 8) 125; UNSW Human Rights Clinic, Temporary Migrant Workers in Australia 
(Issues Paper, 15 October 2015) 9. 
 172 Interview with Former 7-Eleven Employee (Melbourne, 4 May 2016). See also Nyland et al  
(n 19) 6. 
 173 Ullat Thodi and Alawala, Submission (n 153) 5 [51]. For discussion of the paralysing impact 
of students’ considerable debts to finance their studies, see Michiel Baas, ‘Students of Migra-
tion: Indian Overseas Students and the Question of Permanent Residency’ (2006) 14(1) People 
and Place 9, 13, 15; Reilly, ‘Protecting Vulnerable Migrant Workers’ (n 149) 186–7. 
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conditions’.174 This was certainly the perception of many 7-Eleven student em-
ployees.175 Ullat Thodi cited the visa restriction as the key factor confining in-
ternational students to employers like 7-Eleven: ‘You do not want to hire some-
one if you are going to call them to come in for work and they will say, “I’m 
over 20 hours.” You have to be someone who is reliable or can work unlim-
ited.’176 Moreover, the fact that many franchisees from South Asia and China 
tended to recruit from within those same ethnic communities led employees to 
fear not only losing their job if they reported noncompliance, but also being 
portrayed negatively within their community and narrowing future job op-
tions.177 Where students work in close geographic proximity to their place of 
study, intense competition for casual work can drive down conditions further, 
and exacerbate job loss fears.178 
In addition to these fears of job loss, a reluctance to complain was some-
times fuelled by feelings of loyalty to the employer, or more serious fears of re-
taliation. In many cases, the franchisee was the employee’s friend or relative.179 
This is consistent with trends for international students in general, with more 
than one in five (23%) international student respondents to the National Tem-
porary Migrant Work Survey reporting that they found their lowest paid job 
through a friend or family member.180 A lawyer working with claimants ob-
served that some employees were only willing to make claims to the WRP if 
they knew that the franchisee would not be responsible for paying.181 Reflecting 
the complex interplay between these feelings of loyalty and fear, one 7-Eleven 
employee observed: 
 
 174 Joo-Cheong Tham, Supplementary Submission No 3.1 to Senate Education and Employment 
References Committee, Inquiry into the Impact of Australia’s Temporary Work Visa Programs 
on the Australian Labour Market and on the Temporary Work Visa Holders (16 September 2015) 
10 (citations omitted). 
 175 Evidence to Education and Employment References Committee, Senate, Melbourne, 24 Sep-
tember 2015, 27 (Rahul Patil) (‘When I came in I applied at almost every place I could work 
for’); Interview with Former 7-Eleven Employee (Melbourne, 4 May 2016) (‘Basically, immi-
gration need to take that twenty hours of work limit out of the condition so that people come 
in straight away apply for a job, nobody even dare to ask, “Do you have twenty hours work 
limit?”’). 
 176 Evidence to Education and Employment References Committee, Senate, Melbourne, 24 Sep-
tember 2015, 5. 
 177 See also Nyland et al (n 19) 8. 
 178 See Jacqui Mills and Lily Zhang, United Voice, Submission No 163 to Department of Immi-
gration and Citizenship, Strategic Review of the Student Visa Program (2011) 6, 8. 
 179 Interview with Levitt Robinson Lawyer (Melbourne, 26 April 2016). 
 180 National Temporary Migrant Work Survey (n 13) 6, 33. 
 181 Interview with Levitt Robinson Lawyer (Melbourne, 26 April 2016). 
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I’m really grateful to the person who employed me as I had a large student debt 
from studying in Brisbane. It’s hard to speak against them, they gave me a job. 
I’m not looking for back payment or anything like that. I would like to see this 
not happening to other international students. He gave me certain terms and I 
accepted them. I am worried that he will call me and harass me.182 
7-Eleven management noted the difficulties of establishing employees’ trust in 
the program and that the WRP’s confidentiality safeguards had not overcome 
all employees’ fears.183 Ultimately, however, for the many employees who had 
not previously made claims before but filed claims with the WRP, the WRP’s 
confidentiality safeguards provided them with sufficient comfort that no nega-
tive repercussions would flow from their direct franchise employer as a result 
of their coming forward. This could not be replicated in FWO or court claims 
for due process and other reasons, and was a clear advantage of the WRP model 
over those forums. 
C  Sidestepping the Potential Jurisdictional Bar to Pursuing a Claim in Court 
Many of the 7-Eleven employees who had breached their visa restrictions may 
have faced a further, and potentially insurmountable, jurisdictional barrier to 
pursuing their claim in court. Some case law suggests that visa holders who 
have engaged in unauthorised work184 are excluded from the rights under their 
employment contract and the FW Act.185 In several decisions, courts and the 
Fair Work Commission have held that where work undertaken pursuant to an 
employment contract is prohibited by the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), that con-
tract is invalid and unenforceable.186 Although decided in the context of work-
ers compensation and unfair dismissal provisions, this precedent seems to sug-
gest that international students working in excess of 40 hours per fortnight 
 
 182 Inquiry into 7-Eleven (n 28) 51. 
 183 Interview with 7-Eleven Management and Deloitte Representative (Melbourne, 21 February 
2017). 
 184 Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 235 (offence of working contrary to visa conditions). 
 185 Robert Guthrie, ‘Illegal Contracts: Impropriety, Immigrants and Impairment in Employment 
Law’ (2002) 27 Alternative Law Journal 116, 116–18; Stephen Clibborn, ‘Why Undocumented 
Immigrant Workers Should Have Workplace Rights’ (2015) 26 Economic and Labour Relations 
Review 465; Berg (n 8) ch 6. See generally Stephen Howells, Report of the 2010 Review of the 
Migration Amendment (Employer Sanctions) Act 2007 (Report, 2 March 2011). 
 186 For case law holding that breach of s 235 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) voids an otherwise 
valid contract of employment, see Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd v Kazi [2004] 2 Qd R 458, 
466 [32]–[34]; Smallwood v Ergo Asia Pty Ltd [2014] FWC 964. 
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would not be covered by FW Act entitlements, including minimum wage, mod-
ern awards and the basic safeguards in the National Employment Standards. 
However, other decisions have adopted a different approach, reasoning that 
it is not necessarily contrary to public policy, nor contrary to the intent of the 
relevant legislative scheme, to uphold employment entitlements to an employee 
working in breach of visa conditions.187 Indeed, the FWO itself takes the view 
that the FW Act applies to all employees and has successfully brought enforce-
ment proceedings where migrant workers have breached visa conditions, in-
cluding cases brought against 7-Eleven franchisees (although the contrary case 
law was not raised as a defence by employers in those cases).188 
As an extra-legal remedial mechanism, the WRP was able to sidestep these 
issues. Instead, the WRP simply assumed that employees maintained their en-
titlements, regardless of compliance with their visa conditions. Claimants 
therefore avoided the dilemma they would have faced in court: having to 
choose between claiming wages only for the number of work hours permitted 
on their visa, or risking the failure of their entire claim if they claim wages for 
the hours they actually worked.189 
D  Amelioration of Evidentiary Obstacles 
One of the most formidable barriers preventing temporary migrants from in-
stituting wage claims is the form of evidence and standard of proof required by 
 
 187 Nonferral (NSW) Pty Ltd v Taufia (1998) 43 NSWLR 312, 316 (Cole JA), 323 (Stein JA).  
See Breen Creighton and Andrew Stewart, Labour Law (Federation Press, 5th ed, 2010)  
177–8 [7.35]–[7.37]. The legal position is further complicated by the fact that this entire juris-
prudence predates the introduction of specific criminal offences for employers who facilitate 
work in breach of visa conditions, which may be interpreted to signal parliamentary intent to  
enhance employer responsibility for worker exploitation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth)  
ss 245AB–245AD, introduced by Migration Amendment (Employer Sanctions) Act 2007 (Cth), 
the former amended by Migration Amendment (Reform of Employer Sanctions) Act 2013 (Cth). 
High Court dicta in 2015 urges caution before construing a statutory prohibition as denying 
all effect to a contract before considering the adverse consequences for the ‘innocent party’  
to a bargain and ‘the general disinclination on the part of the courts to allow a party to a con-
tract to take advantage of its own wrongdoing’: Gnych v Polish Club Ltd (2015) 255 CLR 414, 
426–7 [45] (citations omitted). For further discussion of this case in this context, see Andrew 
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FMCA 258; Fair Work Ombudsman v Shafi Investments Pty Ltd [2012] FMCA 1150; Haider  
(n 26). 
 189 Hemingway (n 11) 226. 
2018] Remedies for Migrant Worker Exploitation in Australia 33 
Advance Copy 
the FWO and the courts.190 7-Eleven employees often did not have the requisite 
evidence of the number of hours they had actually worked or the wages they 
received.191 International student employees are often paid in cash,192 do not 
have access to their employer’s records and are not furnished with pay slips.193 
In many cases, employers subsequently fabricate records and/or employee pay 
slips.194 This was particularly problematic for 7-Eleven employees because of 
the systemic franchisee practice of either fraudulently recording only half of an 
employee’s hours, or keeping accurate records but then requiring employees to 
return half their pay in cash.195 As one advocate described, ‘the whole program 
is set up to make sure the worker doesn’t have access to evidence, apart from 
maybe what he’s secretly kept himself’.196 
The WRP enabled employees to access necessary corroborating evidence 
such as rosters that would not otherwise have been available to them.197 Once 
a claim was submitted, the first stage of the process was for Deloitte staff to 
consider whether data from head office records could support the claim, or to 
help identify the hours that the claimant worked, taking into account that an 
employee’s memory and personal records may be limited.198 Fels saw this as 
critical to the WRP’s ability to successfully process claims.199 Underpinned by 
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a commitment to ‘stand[ing] in the affected workers’ shoes in processing their 
claims’,200 7-Eleven considered the WRP to be tasked with marshalling internal 
data to validate the employee’s claim, rather than identifying ways to negate or 
minimise it.201 
The majority of claims were addressed solely through Deloitte’s advisory 
and support role.202 Indeed, Deloitte initially prioritised the more straightfor-
ward claims that could be verified against existing 7-Eleven payroll system rec-
ords.203 In some cases, Deloitte identified extra hours that the claimant had 
worked beyond what they identified, resulting in a greater payout than the 
claimant had expected.204 Where Deloitte had concerns about a claim or be-
lieved further work was necessary to understand the claim, it proceeded to a 
second stage in which it deployed its forensic investigation team to obtain fur-
ther evidence,205 taking into account data submitted by the employee, data from 
7-Eleven, and relevant information on the public record.206 
Even for employees who had some evidence of their hours and pay, the 
standard of proof that they would have had to meet in court would have often 
still been unattainable. A high evidentiary standard was also an obstacle to as-
sistance from the FWO. The FWO performs an evidence-gathering role in only 
a very small number of cases alleging contraventions of the FW Act.207 And 
when it undertakes this role, such as during its inquiry into 7-Eleven, the FWO 
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 206 Interview with 7-Eleven Management and Deloitte Representative (Melbourne, 21 February 
2017). 
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requires a high evidentiary threshold to pursue compliance measures. Like the 
WRP, the FWO was given access by 7-Eleven to a range of internal payroll and 
franchisee records,208 but the FWO found much of this too partial or unreliable 
to be used to substantiate wage underpayment to its thresholds of proof.209 The 
agency appeared unwilling to draw inferences in employees’ favour when they 
lacked documentary corroboration, even in the face of clear patterns of em-
ployer misconduct.210 The high scepticism the FWO brought to uncorroborated 
employee testimony produced a presumption in favour of employers, especially 
in the absence of pay slips. For instance, after a series of unannounced visits 
and audits of 7-Eleven stores over one day in 2014, FWO found record-keeping 
inconsistencies in 19 out of 20 stores and it was not ‘able to positively conclude 
that any of the stores visited were fully compliant with their obligations’.211 Nev-
ertheless, because FWO was ‘unable to find sufficient evidence to prove wages 
or record keeping contraventions in four stores, despite unexplained inconsist-
encies in the records and information obtained’, it took no further action in 
relation to these stores.212 
In contrast to the high evidentiary standards in court and adopted by the 
FWO, a central feature of the WRP was its lower evidentiary threshold. The 
structural and homogeneous nature of the fraudulent and exploitative practices 
across franchises enabled the WRP to apply basic presumptions in favour of 
employees. For example, because of the pervasive ‘half pay’ practice among 
franchisees, in some cases the WRP was willing to assume that employees had 
worked significantly more hours than were recorded by the franchisee, even 
when this could not conclusively be proven because of fabricated records.213 
Most fundamentally, the secretariat proceeded on the assumption that the em-
ployee’s account was true, and in case of doubt, would err on the side of the 
employee.214 Although there is no publicly available formulation of the stand-
ard of proof adopted by the WRP, lawyers who brought claims before the Fels 
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Panel described it as akin to ‘reasonably likely to be true under the circum-
stances’.215 Deloitte testified before the Senate inquiry that it received the infor-
mation submitted by the employee and then used pay slips and verbal evidence 
to extrapolate ‘and say, by and large, their claim holds’.216 
E  Provision of Information and Assistance with Claims 
Many temporary migrant workers lack a detailed understanding of their enti-
tlements.217 Moreover, very few are aware of the existence and functions of the 
FWO, unions or other pathways to remedies. The WRP helped overcome these 
barriers in a number of respects. 
For a start, the Fels Panel conducted significant outreach to raise awareness 
among current and former employees.218 The WRP also recognised the strong 
need for technical expertise to support 7-Eleven employees to calculate the 
amount owing to them and present claims in an organised, coherent and con-
sistent manner.219 This assistance overcame much of the resource intensiveness 
of lodging an application in court or submitting a ‘Request for Assistance’ with 
the FWO.220 In particular, calculating an employee’s wages and entitlements is 
time-consuming and requires mathematical skills,221 as well as knowledge of 
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the appropriate award classification, base rate of pay and other rates applicable 
at different times.222 The WRP devoted substantial resources to calculating the 
amounts owing to employees based on application of standard, weekend, holi-
day and overtime rates of pay, as well as superannuation entitlements and in-
terest,223 including identifying and applying historical award rates in the years 
prior to modern awards.224 Although the Pay and Conditions Tool (‘PACT’) on 
the FWO website is intended to enable employees to determine their rate of pay 
(including penalty rates), this tool does not assist clients to determine the actual 
amount owing, and may be difficult to use for employees who are unable to 
identify their precise job classification. For numerous community-based legal 
service-providers and private firms, the resource intensiveness of the calcula-
tions process is one of the greatest obstacles to their ability to represent tempo-
rary migrants to recover unpaid entitlements.225 
The extent of the need for this assistance among 7-Eleven employees is clear 
from the fact that between 25 September 2014 and 7 July 2016, 1,546 employees 
used a private online wage calculator platform developed by Michael Fraser to 
calculate the amount owing to 7-Eleven workers. Unlike the FWO PACT tool, 
Fraser’s platform asked employees to enter days and times they had worked, 
and then algorithmically applied relevant award rates and applicable penalty 
rates and loadings to calculate the approximate amount owing to the employee. 
This demonstrates that despite the significant barriers to making complaints 
and the limited extent to which employees approached the FWO, it is possible 
to reach large numbers of international students, equip them with necessary 
information and have them come forward with breaches of their workplace 
rights when they trust the recipient of the information. Moreover, Fraser en-
gaged in this outreach with exceptionally limited resources, establishing trust 
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and sharing information within employee communities primarily through so-
cial media, word of mouth, phone calls and SMS.226 
The WRP expressed a strong commitment to the principle that employees 
did not require legal representation. One advocate observed that the ability to 
make a claim without legal representation reduced opportunities for unscrupu-
lous private lawyers to take advantage of employees requiring assistance.227 Law 
firm Maurice Blackburn did provide free legal advice and representation to over 
a 100 claimants before the WRP. Lawyers at the firm observed that their repre-
sentation substantially increased employees’ prospects of success and made the 
process more accessible for employees, especially those with poor English or 
other vulnerabilities.228 This was disputed by Alan Fels and 7-Eleven, who 
maintained that the substantial assistance provided by the WRP ensured that 
represented and unrepresented employees fared the same.229 
Finally, the WRP made inroads into employees’ inability to bring claims 
once they had returned home, where they no longer have immigration-related 
and job-loss fears.230 This is significant because legal service-providers gener-
ally consider the fact that the employee is no longer in Australia to be a further 
practical hurdle to running their case.231 In contrast, it appears to have been 
easier for former employees to lodge a claim with the WRP from abroad, since 
no hearings were required and all communications with the WRP secretariat 
were over the phone. Indeed, where the WRP received an expression of interest 
from abroad, Deloitte’s office in a claimant’s country attempted to contact the 
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employee to provide assistance.232 Nevertheless, it appears that few former em-
ployees who were overseas were aware of the WRP.233 Indeed, among the seven 
employees who were involved in the FWO’s litigation against Bosen, only Ullat 
Thodi remained in Australia by the time the WRP was established. Although 
Ullat Thodi submitted a claim, he observed that the six workers who returned 
to India would not have known about the WRP and to his knowledge had not 
made claims.234 
F  Demonstration Effect of Swift, Successful Claims 
The professionalisation of the claims handling process under the WRP allevi-
ated the hesitations of employees who were ‘watching and waiting’ before filing 
their own claim. Claims were paid out relatively swiftly, including a quick initial 
tranche of determinations.235 In February 2016, 7-Eleven made the first reme-
dial payments for claims submitted to the WRP.236 By May, ‘the [P]anel had … 
paid about 400 claims at an average of about $35,000 each’, totalling approxi-
mately $14 million.237 This included two claims of approximately $350,000 
each, with several more in the pipeline that at the time were projected to be 
$200,000 to $300,000 each.238 This was an early demonstration to other employ-
ees that, if they made a claim, they were likely to receive a positive, and sub-
stantial, outcome. The WRP remained open to new claims for a further year 
after it began making payments, ensuring that many employees would have ad-
equate time to submit a claim after they had satisfied themselves as to the merits 
and limited risks of doing so. 
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G  Circumvention of Employer Insolvency and Accessorial Liability Challenges 
A final significant barrier that the WRP circumvented was the prospect that 
even if 7-Eleven employees received a judgment against their franchisee em-
ployer through litigation, the franchisee would simply liquidate and avoid pay-
ing the employee. This happens routinely in cases brought by temporary mi-
grants against labour hire companies and other small business employers.239 
Indeed, in the first two cases the FWO brought against 7-Eleven stores in 2011 
and 2015, employees recouped only a fraction of their legal entitlements after 
many years of proceedings.240 Although the 2015 decision found that an inter-
national student had been underpaid more than $21,000, the corporate em-
ployer escaped penalty because it had been wound up prior to final determina-
tion of the matter.241 The owner was fined (a much-reduced amount of) 
$6,970.242 The financial and emotional impact of these experiences on employ-
ees can be devastating. As Ullat Thodi stated, ‘I took this matter of underpay-
ment and unfair dismissal to the Fair Work Ombudsman, and later to the court. 
I won the case but I lost my job, my pay and my emotional strength.’243 Unlike 
citizens and certain residents, temporary migrant workers are not covered by 
the Fair Entitlements Guarantee, a legislative safety net to cover unpaid em-
ployment entitlements which are outstanding when an employer enters into 
liquidation or bankruptcy.244 
In addition to franchisee insolvency, employees faced considerable legal ob-
stacles in establishing accessorial liability. Notably, employees in the 2011 Bosen 
litigation originally approached 7-Eleven head office to rectify the underpay-
ments but, according to their union representative, ‘7 Eleven head office basi-
cally brushed us off at that point in time and said, “This has got nothing to do 
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with us. This is a franchise. You’ve got to deal with the employer direct.”’245 
Years later the FWO concluded that it lacked a sufficient legal basis to pursue 
7-Eleven head office for accessorial liability under the FW Act for franchisees’ 
conduct. Under s 550, persons other than the direct employer may be found 
liable under a civil remedy provision where they were ‘involved in’ a contraven-
tion of the Act. This element is made out where a person has aided or abetted 
the contravention; procured or ‘induced the contravention, whether by threats 
or promises or otherwise’; or ‘has been in any way, by act or omission, directly 
or indirectly, knowingly concerned in’ the contravention.246 While contraven-
tions of minimum employment standards normally give rise to strict liability 
in respect of the employer, this is not the case for accessories, who must be in-
tentionally and knowingly concerned in the contravention.247 The FWO fre-
quently uses these provisions to hold directors and senior managers liable for 
contraventions committed by the employer corporations for which they were 
responsible.248 However, there have only been a handful of cases in which the 
FWO has sought to use s 550 against a separate corporation which is said to be 
‘involved in’ a contravention of the direct employer.249 
In relation to 7-Eleven, the FWO concluded that 7-Eleven head office ben-
efited from the underpayments, ‘had a reasonable basis on which to inquire and 
to act’ and ‘could have done more, and acted earlier’ to curb noncompliance 
within its franchise network.250 Others, like Allan Fels, formed the impression 
that the profitability of the 7-Eleven franchise business model relied on under-
paying employees.251 The FWO also found that head office knew in some cases 
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about franchisee misconduct and ‘did not adequately … address deliberate 
non-compliance and as a consequence compounded it’252 in circumstances 
where it ‘had a reasonable basis on which to inquire and to act’.253 Nevertheless, 
the FWO determined that it lacked sufficient probative evidence to find that 
head office was knowingly concerned in the underpayments and falsification of 
records.254 Meeting the standard of accessorial liability in this case was chal-
lenging because no cases to date have considered the s 550 liability of a head 
franchisor for franchisee contraventions of civil remedy provisions of the FW 
Act concerning underpayments.255 
By contrast, under the WRP, 7-Eleven accepted unlimited responsibility for 
repaying unpaid entitlements for any current and former employee in any store 
in Australia, neutering the effect of any individual franchisee’s incapacity to 
pay. Moreover, the WRP had no limitations period for bringing claims or a cap 
on the amount that could be claimed. This helped circumvent challenges in 
pursuing franchisees that were no longer in business, who may liquidate, or 
were not financially capable of servicing a substantial wage repayment debt. 
VI  G E N E R A L I S A B I L I T Y  O F  LE S S O N S  LE A R N E D  F R O M  T H E  SU C C E S S  
O F  T H E  WRP 
Attempts to generalise lessons learned from the WRP must be undertaken with 
caution. For a start, the WRP had a relatively short duration and was conceived 
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by a company whose brand was a household name, at risk of considerable rep-
utational damage.256 Moreover, because 7-Eleven is a privately held company, 
there were no public shareholders to contest the establishment of the WRP or 
its approach. The nature of the franchise relationship (as opposed to, say, enti-
ties in a product supply chain) meant that employees did not have to establish 
the head office’s particular relationship with the franchisee. 
Another unusual dimension to the Fels Panel’s genesis was the media por-
trayal of international students. Students were not depicted as opportunistic 
law-breakers, but rather as brave whistleblowers and victims of exploitation and 
blackmail; their unauthorised work was characterised as coerced by unscrupu-
lous franchisees.257 The resulting public sympathy for the employees drove the 
public and specific DIBP conditional assurance against visa cancellation which 
was unprecedented at the time. The WRP also benefited from 7-Eleven’s ongo-
ing media promotion of its proactive response to the revelations, which may 
have increased the program’s visibility among potential claimants. 
It is similarly dangerous to conclude from the 7-Eleven example that busi-
ness-led redress mechanisms generally present an effective model for address-
ing systemic employee underpayment. The WRP was certainly not perfect. Alt-
hough it significantly ameliorated barriers such as immigration-related fears, it 
did not do so entirely.258 Fels observed that the process had been undermined 
by ‘deception, fearmongering, intimidation and even some physical actions of 
intimidation by franchisees’ against employees and their families overseas, to 
dissuade employees from making claims.259 More than 2,000 employees con-
tacted the WRP but, at the time the WRP concluded, had not yet gone forward 
and submitted a claim, and many thousands of potential claimants did not con-
tact the WRP at all.260 A substantial number of the latter were likely unaware of 
 
 256 Hardy observes that the 7-Eleven story ‘demonstrates the power of informal sanctions, such as 
disapproval, adverse publicity and ostracisation’: Tess Hardy, Submission No 62 to Senate Ed-
ucation and Employment References Committee, Inquiry into the Impact of Australia’s Tempo-
rary Work Visa Programs on the Australian Labour Market and on the Temporary Work Visa 
Holders, 7. 
 257 See, eg, ABC, ‘7-Eleven: The Price of Convenience’ (n 25). 
 258 See Part V(B). 
 259 Evidence to Education and Employment References Committee, Senate, Canberra,  
5 February 2016, 30 (Allan Fels, Fels Wage Fairness Panel); see also at 31; Paul Karp,  
‘7-Eleven Workers Beaten and Forced to Pay Back Wages, Senate Inquiry Hears’, The  
Guardian (Sydney, 5 February 2016) <www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/feb/05/7-
eleven-workers-beaten-and-forced-to-pay-back-wages-senate-inquiry-hears>, archived at 
<https://perma.cc/F74W-BMWS>. 
 260 Fels estimated that over half of the more than 20,000 individuals who had worked for 7-Eleven 
franchises over the past 10 years would likely have valid claims for underpayment: Interview 
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the WRP. It is impossible to determine how many others did not come forward 
because of fear or other reasons. 
More broadly, the WRP raises the significant public policy concern that  
7-Eleven escaped full legal accountability for its actions. Although the company 
incurred the substantial financial burden of administering the WRP and repay-
ing up to $150 million in wages owed by its franchisees, it was not subjected to 
any legal sanction for its role in the systemic breaches of workplace laws in its 
franchises over many years that resulted in the exploitation of thousands of em-
ployees. It also escaped repayment of the likely thousands of other employees 
who did not come forward and make claims. Moreover, while the FWO 
achieved record-breaking penalties in the FCCA against a handful of fran-
chisees, there are another 440 franchisees who may pay only a fraction of their 
debts to employees (if head office opts to recoup these)261 and will suffer no 
other sanction. 
At a structural level, the extra-legal character of the WRP and lack of trans-
parency around its claims-determination methodology may have resulted in 
positive outcomes for employees in this case (for example, through swift deter-
minations and flexible worker-oriented presumptions in the absence of evi-
dence), but this could act to the serious detriment of employees under different 
circumstances.262 Indeed, the WRP was heavily dependent on the goodwill of 
7-Eleven’s head office. If the company’s sole concerns had been public image, 
they might have sought to achieve a similar result through a cheaper, less robust 
redress mechanism awarding lower payouts.263 
 
with Allan Fels (Melbourne, 29 March 2016). This compares with the 5,347 expressions of in-
terest that the WRP received from workers. As of February 2017, only 3,256 of these had been 
converted into claims through employees providing the minimum required information even 
though 7-Eleven committed the secretariat to ‘continue to follow up a number of claimants 
that are yet to provide the minimum required information, despite repeated communication 
attempts’: Interview with 7-Eleven Management and Deloitte Representative (Melbourne, 21 
February 2017). 
 261 See Part III. 
 262 It is also arguably unfair to franchisees if they would be required to reimburse head office for 
payments to workers without an opportunity to interrogate the evidence and reasoning applied 
and the quantum calculated in a particular case. 
 263 The existing regulatory enforcement literature suggests that to induce or compel lead firms and 
franchisors to commit to these types of voluntary initiatives, particularly in the longer term, it 
is necessary to have sufficient positive and/or negative incentives: see generally Ayres and 
Braithwaite (n 101). 
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This is in fact what happened in the case of the poultry producer Baiada in 
2015, which also set up a fund in response to findings of exploitation of em-
ployees by a subordinate entity.264 In that case, Baiada’s labour hire contractors 
were found to be significantly underpaying ‘Working Holiday Makers’. Unlike 
the WRP, Baiada’s fund was established as part of a Proactive Compliance Deed 
with the FWO following an inquiry by the regulator.265 Despite an estimated 
$10 million in underpayments outstanding to temporary migrant workers on 
Baiada plants,266 the fund was capped at $500,000 and covered only a 10-month 
period of underpayments, with a strict claims filing deadline. Although the 
fund operated consistently with the requirements of the Proactive Compliance 
Deed, the company only investigated 153 claims.267 A National Union of Work-
ers (‘NUW’) representative attributed the low number of claims to several fac-
tors. Many employees were unaware of the fund because of the transience of 
Working Holiday Makers and, in contrast to the WRP, the Baiada fund was not 
well publicised.268 Further, Baiada’s fund did not provide claimants with the 
kind of assistance that was provided by the WRP’s Deloitte-operated secretar-
iat. Consequently, even if employees became aware of the fund, they needed 
representation or assistance to lodge a claim,269 which many lacked. 
Baiada determined that there had been underpayment in 91 of the 153 
claims submitted. It made payments totalling $218,768.79 — less than half of 
the allotted fund. The company recouped $168,709.27 of the payout from its 
labour hire contractors, and in the end paid employees $50,059.52 in ex gratia 
payments.270 Unions representing the claimants indicated that even among the 
claims brought by employees with union assistance, a significant number were 
rejected in whole or in part. Of the 22 ‘successful’ claims filed by NUW, 17 re-
 
 264 FWO, Outcomes of the Compliance Partnership between the Fair Work Ombudsman and the 
Baiada Group (Interim Report, November 2016) 4–5 (‘Baiada Group Interim Report’). 
 265 Ibid 4–5, 7. The report also found limited oversight and governance arrangements by Baiada 
concerning its labour supply chains, and made a series of recommendations to Baiada con-
cerning its labour sourcing arrangements going forward: FWO, A Report on the Fair Work 
Ombudsman’s Inquiry into the Labour Procurement Arrangements of the Baiada Group in New 
South Wales (Report, June 2015) 16–26, 30. 
 266 Interview with National Union of Workers Representative (Adelaide, 31 May 2016). 
 267 This was comprised of ‘17 requests for assistance referred by the FWO’, ‘120 claims submitted 
via the employee’s union which was either the AMIEU or the National Union of Workers’, and 
‘16 claims directly made to the Baiada Hotline’: Baiada Group Interim Report (n 264) 23–4. 
 268 Interview with NUW Representative (Adelaide, 31 May 2016). 
 269 Ibid. 
 270 Baiada Group Interim Report (n 264) 23–4. 
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ceived less than half of what they calculated they were owed. A number of em-
ployees received far less, including one who was paid only $755 of the $17,990 
underpayment he had claimed. Union representatives attributed the high rejec-
tion rate to the narrow 10-month eligibility window,271 and the requirement to 
provide specific forms of information which workers lacked (such as their 
ABN).272 A significant number of claims were rejected in part based on work-
ers’ lack of evidence of the hours they had worked and/or the amount they had 
been paid, as many were paid in cash. 
The Baiada case illustrates the potential for exposed companies to respond 
to negative media attention by establishing redress mechanisms that are limited 
in scope and outcomes and do little to effectively remedy substantial employee 
underpayment. It is therefore not the fact of the WRP’s existence, but rather the 
details of its operation, from which lessons must be drawn for state-based re-
dress processes and any future business-led mechanisms. 
VII  CO N C LU SI O N  
For the vast numbers of temporary migrant workers who are deprived of enti-
tlements they are owed under the FW Act, there is no reliable and accessible 
mechanism through which they can obtain a remedy.273 The experience of un-
derpaid 7-Eleven employees prior to August 2015 reveals a clear need for re-
form of existing remedial mechanisms. The small claims jurisdiction in the 
FCCA was not utilised by a single 7-Eleven employee. The relevant union did 
not bring claims on behalf of 7-Eleven employees, and virtually none were 
members. The FWO did not recover meaningful quantums of unpaid wages for 
substantial numbers of 7-Eleven employees.274 It received only 27 requests for 
assistance from 7-Eleven migrant employees between 2011 and 2015, of which 
 
 271 Interview with NUW Representative (Adelaide, 31 May 2016). The Baiada fund applied to un-
derpayments that occurred between 1 January and 23 October 2015. Baiada rejected 20 claims 
on this basis: Baiada Group Interim Report (n 264) 24, 24 n 21. 
 272 Interview with AMIEU Newcastle Branch Representative (Sydney, 27 January 2016). 
 273 One survey reported that, of 35 Working Holiday Makers who tried to recover unpaid wages, 
only three were successful: Elsa Underhill and Malcolm Rimmer, ‘Layered Vulnerability: Tem-
porary Migrants in Australian Horticulture’ (2016) 58 Journal of Industrial Relations 608, 619. 
This suggests that temporary migrant workers face specific and acute difficulties in recovering 
unpaid wages, although the history of underpayment indicates this is not unique to this group 
of workers: Miles Goodwin and Glenda Maconachie, ‘Unpaid Entitlement Recovery in the 
Federal Industrial Relations System: Strategy and Outcomes 1952–95’ (2007) 49 Journal of In-
dustrial Relations 523, 523. 
 274 See Part IV(C). 
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only four resulted in recovery of a substantial amount of money. A series of 
audits conducted between 2008 and 2010 recovered less than $1,000 each for 
several hundred employees.275 
Recognising the particular vulnerabilities of temporary migrants, the FWO 
has recently devoted considerable resources to better understanding the work 
experiences of international students and Working Holiday Makers through a 
series of inquiries, detailed investigations276 and commissioned research.277 
Following the events related to 7-Eleven in 2015, the FWO ‘established the Mi-
grant Worker Strategy & Engagement Branch to coordinate effective compli-
ance, education and engagement activities for visa workers’.278 Of the FWO’s 50 
court actions commenced in 2015–16, 76% involved a visa holder.279 The FWO 
has filed a further eight cases against 7-Eleven franchisees since 2015, several 
of which have resulted in fuller recovery of unpaid wages.280 The FWO’s Proac-
tive Compliance Deed with 7-Eleven has set a new standard for franchisor ac-
countability in Australia, requiring the retailer to institute extensive costly 
measures to prevent, detect and remedy noncompliance in the future. 
In the midst of these significant improvements, however, it remains clear 
that the FWO’s core functions do not include systematically ensuring that large 
numbers of individual employees recover their unpaid wages. This would re-
quire an allocation of substantially increased resources and reformulated insti-
tutional structures capable of responding to these employees’ significant need 
for targeted assistance. As a result, courts and the FWO mechanisms remain 
insufficiently accessible to individual underpaid migrant workers and are not 
yielding satisfactory outcomes in relation to individual remedies. 
Yet the fact that so many employees received significant financial remedies 
through the WRP demonstrates that, even in the absence of larger institutional 
reforms, it may be possible to address a number of these systemic barriers that 
impede migrant workers’ access to justice. As the newly established cross-
agency Migrant Workers’ Taskforce281 and other stakeholders seek to address 
exploitation of migrant workers, they should consider opportunities for sys-
temically improving access to employment remedies. It cannot be denied  
 
 275 FWO, ‘FWO Compliance History with “7 Eleven” Stores, 1 Jul 2011 to 30 Jun 2015’ (n 128). 
 276 See n 103. 
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 278 FWO, 2015–16 Fair Work Ombudsman Annual Report (n 113) 15. 
 279 Ibid 1, 22. 
 280 See Part IV(C)(2). 
 281 See ‘Migrant Workers’ Taskforce’, Department of Jobs and Small Business, Australian Govern-
ment (Web Page, 23 January 2018) <www.employment.gov.au/migrant-workers-taskforce>, 
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that the WRP evolved within a unique confluence of circumstances. It is also 
clear that business-led redress mechanisms have a degree of flexibility and re-
sourcing that may not be replicable within government institutions. This can 
make them an attractive compliance strategy for the FWO. However, as the Bai-
ada example demonstrates, if they are not worker-centred they are unlikely to 
genuinely remedy large-scale wage underpayment. Nevertheless, when con-
templating reforms to the FWO and judicial processes or establishing future 
business-led redress mechanisms, integral features of the WRP should be 
drawn upon. 
First, stronger safeguards should be explored to enable migrant workers to 
bring wage claims without risking visa cancellation and removal. In mid-2017, 
for the first time, a new protocol between the FWO and DIBP was publicised, 
stating that a worker’s temporary visa will not be cancelled if they report ex-
ploitation and are actively assisting the FWO in an investigation.282 It applies as 
long as the worker holds a temporary visa with work rights, they commit to 
abide by visa conditions in the future and there is there is no other basis for visa 
cancellation. This certainly reflects a significant step towards protecting tempo-
rary migrants with work rights and the FWO has made great efforts to promote 
this initiative to service-providers and workers themselves. However, the pro-
tection remains partial: it leaves visa-overstayers and tourist visa holders un-
protected. Indeed, it is unclear whether it will offer sufficient comfort to enable 
even those visa holders with work rights to come forward and report exploita-
tion. It does not appear to give rise to any right on the part of a visa holder to 
appeal a visa cancellation on the basis of unauthorised work. Nor does it estab-
lish a firewall between the FWO and the DIBP such that the FWO can guaran-
tee the confidentiality of information provided by migrant workers requesting 
assistance. To the contrary, it requires that the FWO notify DIBP of the migrant 
worker’s visa status to obtain the visa cancellation dispensation. The dispensa-
tion is also conditional on the FWO’s assessment as to the whether the individ-
ual is actively assisting the FWO and it is unclear whether the dispensation 
could be withheld or revoked if the migrant worker does not wish to participate 
or continue participating in an investigation, or if the FWO declines to pursue 
the matter further. For these reasons, government reviews and scholars have 
called for workers’ immigration status to be more strongly insulated from their 
 
 282 ‘Visa Holders and Migrants’, Fair Work Ombudsman, Australian Government (Web Page) 
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2018] Remedies for Migrant Worker Exploitation in Australia 49 
Advance Copy 
labour claims via a firewall between the FWO and DIBP283 and for entitlement 
to a bridging visa if necessary to regularise stay while a labour claim is under 
determination.284 Law reform measures should also be considered to ensure the 
validity of employment contracts where work has been undertaken in breach 
of visa conditions.285 
Second, while there are many structural contributors to the vulnerable po-
sition of temporary migrants in the labour market, there may be opportunities 
to reduce some of the obstacles to pursuing a claim for unpaid entitlements, 
although these would require a significantly increased allocation of resources. 
Most fundamentally, avenues should be explored for increasing the availability 
and resourcing of the provision of assistance to migrant workers, recognising 
the high level of support that most need in order to formulate and file a claim.286 
This includes assistance to calculate wage claims, and representation of employ-
ees in direct negotiations with employers. This support could take the form of 
greater assistance by the FWO, expanded service-provision by legal service-
providers,287 a greater role for unions, and/or innovative use of technology and 
wage calculator platforms.288 It may also include simplified processes for initi-
ating a claim or a request for the FWO’s assistance, with greater support from 
the FWO to obtain further necessary information. 
Third, a fairer burden of proof should be considered, to account for eviden-
tiary hurdles posed by missing or falsified employment records and pay slips 
that are the result of exploitation in the first place.289 This could incorporate a 
reverse onus of proof under the FW Act where the employer has failed to pro-
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vide pay slips, such that the employer bears the burden of demonstrating com-
pliance under those circumstances.290 There may also be scope for the FWO to 
adopt more generous evidentiary standards when deciding whether to pursue 
a migrant worker’s claim in the absence of pay slips. 
Finally, avenues for ensuring that employees can obtain remedies when their 
employer is unwilling or unable to pay should be considered. This includes 
strengthening franchisors’ responsibility for the conduct of franchisees in cer-
tain circumstances,291 as well as extending access to government safety nets 
when an employer liquidates.292 Ultimately, the state should adopt measures 
that ensure that the debt for unpaid wages is not left with a low-wage migrant 
worker, the party least able to absorb it. 
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